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ABSTRACT
The cost accounting system at Boeing does not emphasize flow time, the time
required by the production system to manufacture a product, as a significant
manufacturing cost. Current emphasis on schedule adherence, along with
close management attention to work station head count, encourage
production supervisors to maintain flow time and minimize head count. In
this thesis, I show that flow time is a significant manufacturing cost and that
exclusion of this cost has resulted in production decisions that over
emphasized head count reduction, at the expense of flow time.
I define flow time cost and examine three components of flow time cost: 1)
inventory carrying cost, 2) revenue opportunity cost, and 3) variable capital
cost. I show that including flow time cost in the management accounting
system has significant implications on present production planning
methodology.
After discussing flow time cost, I present a dual-prong strategy for flow time
reduction. First, I propose a near term flow time reduction strategy through
evaluation of potential trades of human and/or capital investments for
immediate flow time reduction. This near term strategy reverses the effects
of past production decisions that relied on head count to realize learning
curve benefits. Next, I propose a far term flow time reduction strategy by
evaluating the impact of system variances on manufacturing productivity.
The analysis shows that for major shops within the manufacturing sequence,
a number of "vital few" variances account for the majority of the effects on
manufacturing productivity. Secondary cause-effect analysis shows that the
Engineering organization has significant indirect impact on manufacturing
productivity through its effects on these "vital few" variances. I propose an
alternate resource allocation methodology based on the results of the
statistical analysis.
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Next, I examine the importance of modifying the current incentive system for
motivating the organization towards continuous flow time reduction.
Specifically, I propose that flow time cost be charged directly to the operating
divisions and that it be incorporated as part of the management performance
evaluation and reward system. I suggest that restructuring the incentive
system to include flow time cost will motivate cross functional
communication between the operations and engineering organizations and
lead to significant near term and far term flow time reduction in the
manufacturing sequence.
The above recommendations, formulated with the insights and experiences
of numerous Boeing engineers and managers, were presented to Boeing
management and have received strong support. A planning directive has
been issued at Boeing's Everett plant to implement these recommendations.
Thesis supervisors: Alvin W. Drake
Professor of Electrical Engineering
and Computer Science
Stephen C. Graves
Leaders for Manufacturing Professor
Deputy Dean, Sloan School of Management
Thomas E. Kochan
George Maverick Bunker Professor
of Management
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INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Boeing is the world's most successful airplane manufacturer. In 1990,
Boeing's family of commercial passenger airplanes' carried over 700 million
passengers 2 to destination all over the globe. Boeing's over fifty percent
market share of the worldwide airplane market continues to lead all other
airplane manufacturers.
The competitive positions in the industry, however, are evolving.
While Boeing's chief competitor had historically been the McDonnell
Douglas Corporation 3, the past decade has seen the displacement of
McDonnell Douglas from the number two position in the airplane market by
Airbus Industries, a consortium formed by four European governments
(England, Germany, France, and Spain). The financial support provided by
these four governments to Airbus for the development and manufacturing of
new airplanes has resulted in significant market gains for Airbus and made it
a legitimate player in the industry. The rapid rate that Airbus has sustained
in gaining market share during the 1980s highlights the importance that
Airbus has placed on the commercial aviation industry and underlines its
determination to become a key player in the airframe market.
1The Boeing 707, 727, 737, 747, 757, 767 (the Boeing 777 will be introduced in 1994).
2Cruze, Deane. Breaking Out of the Box, MANAGER - Boeing Management Magazine, Mar-
April 1990.
3 McDonnell Douglas presently produces the MD-80, DC-10 and MD-11 airplanes.
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Chapter 1
Boeing though is not resting on its laurels. Current Boeing leadership
is emphasizing the importance of continuous quality improvement (CQI) and
has made it an explicit goal of the corporation to use CQI as the preferred way
to improve product quality, customer service and corporate profitability. This
commitment has also resulted in Boeing's participation in the Leaders for
Manufacturing (LFM) program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The Leaders for Manufacturing program, a joint effort between the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and eleven industrial partners 4 , has as
its mission to educate future leaders for manufacturing and to improve U.S
industrial competitiveness.
In this thesis, I present the results of my thesis internship at The Boeing
Company. In June 1990, I started my internship at Boeing in the New
Airplane Division5 to conduct research for a joint engineering and
management thesis for the department of Electrical Engineering and the
Sloan School of Management. My Boeing advisor recommended that I study
the Boeing 767 final assembly process at Boeing's Everett, Washington plant
to assimilate lessons learned about 767 manufacturing and to make specific
recommendations for the 777 program.
I conducted my study at the Everett plant from mid-July through mid-
December of 1990. During those six months, I worked closely with various
groups at the Everett facility (especially the Industrial Engineering group) and
learned valuable lessons from the people around me. At the end of the
4 The industrial partners are Alcoa, Boeing, Chrysler, Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC),
General Motors, Hewlett-Packard, Johnson & Johnson, Kodak, Motorola, Polaroid, and United
Technology Corporation (UTC).
5 The New Airplane Division is now known as the Boeing 777 division
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internship, we (I and all the people at Boeing who generously gave their time
and support) formulated a set of three specific recommendations based on our
six month study. These recommendations, detailed in chapters 3, 4 and 5,
should not only have a positive impact on the Everett plant, but on the 777
division as well.
1.2 Thesis Summary
In this thesis I present results of my six-and-half month research internship at
The Boeing Company. I show that the traditional accounting system in use at
Boeing does not consider flow time as a significant manufacturing cost.
Current emphasis on schedule adherence, along with management focus on
worker head count, encourage production supervisors to maintain or
increase flow time and minimize head count. I show that flow time is a
significant manufacturing cost and examine three specific elements of flow
time cost. I analyze how flow time cost will affect present Boeing production
planning methodology and propose an alternate methodology which
incorporates flow time cost into the production planning and resource
allocation process.
Next, I present a dual prong strategy for flow time reduction. I propose
that flow time can be reduced in the near term through examination and
evaluation of alternate flow time reduction proposals aimed at reversing the
effects of past production decisions (which overemphasized head count
reduction to utilize the benefits of worker learning, at the expense of flow
time). These flow time reduction proposals, which may be investments in
human and/or capital equipment, should be evaluated by the marginal cost
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(cost of implementation, a one time cost) and the marginal benefit (flow time
cost reduction, a recurring benefit) of individual proposals.
Interestingly, while the near term strategy increases corporate profitability (we
would not implement flow time reduction proposals which do not contribute
to improved profitability), it does not improve manufacturing productivity.
To improve manufacturing productivity, I show, through my analysis of
variance impact on manufacturing productivity 6, that we must reduce the
frequency of occurrence of some "vital few" variances. I show that
Engineering plays an important, albeit indirect, role in determining
manufacturing productivity.
Finally, I suggest that the current incentive system be re-aligned to
motivate organizational change. Specifically, I suggest that flow time cost be
incorporated as a management performance objective and that it be charged
directly to operating division budgets. I suggest that moving flow time costs
to the level where they are actually incurred (and where their overall level
are actually determined) will better focus divisional management attention
on the relative tradeoffs between components of total product cost. Moving
flow time cost responsibility to the divisional level thus empowers division
management to make production and resource allocation decisions which are
consistent with reducing total product cost rather than specific elements of
total product cost.
6 Variance is defined as "factors or elements within the manufacturing environment that affect
the execution of baseline manufacturing operations". See chapter 4 for detailed discussions.
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1.3 Thesis Organization
A brief description of each of the remaining chapters in this thesis follows.
Chapter 2 Nature of Airplane Manufacturing
This chapter describes some of the methodologies used during production
planning within Boeing's manufacturing organization. In particular, we look
at production planning tools such as the number one flow chart, the master
schedule, and the crew size studies. Readers familiar with the methodologies
of the production planning process can skip this chapter and proceed directly
to chapter 3.
Chapter 3 Flow Time Cost
In this chapter, I introduce the concept of flow time cost and detail three
major cost elements: inventory carrying cost, revenue opportunity cost, and
variable tooling cost. I go over each of these cost elements and give examples
showing how to calculate these costs.
Next, I propose that future resource allocation evaluation criteria
include flow time cost/benefits. I then examine how flow time cost visibility
will affect current production planning methodology and propose an
alternate methodology which better utilizes labor productivity
improvements. Finally, I propose a near term flow time reduction strategy.
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Chapter 4 Analysis of System Variance Impact on Direct
Manufacturing Labor Input
In this chapter, I describe sources of system variances within an aircraft
manufacturing environment and present a working hypothesis regarding the
effects of system variances on manufacturing productivity. I detail the
methodology of the statistical analysis used to analyze the effects of system
variances on manufacturing labor input (additive model with input
variances and associated sensitivities) and outline assumptions intrinsic
within the analysis. Next, I present results of the statistical analysis.
This will be followed by a discussion of the results and the implication
these results have for the work areas. Finally, I present a far term flow time
reduction strategy.
Chapter 5 Role of Incentive Systems in Motivating Organizational
Change
This chapter is devoted to how incentive systems can be structured to instill
organizational impetus to initiate and sustain flow time reduction programs.
I suggest that under the present incentive system, where process efficiencies
are realized through labor reductions, there is a negative feedback to workers
to improve the manufacturing process due to fear for job security. I show that
under the proposed system, where productivity improvements are realized
through flow time reductions rather than labor reductions, there will be
positive feedback for workers and supervisors to renew focus on process
improvements.
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To further motivate efforts toward continuous flow time
improvement, I recommend that flow time be added to manufacturing
performance objectives. Specifically, I suggest that flow time be included as
an operating division budget item.
Chapter 6 Conclusion
I open this chapter with a review of the recommendations made in the
preceding chapters and detail actions Boeing management has taken to
address these issues. Finally, I suggest some applications of the
methodologies presented in this thesis to other industries.
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Chapter 2 NATURE OF AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we discuss the nature of airplane manufacturing. Specifically,
we describe the organization of the manufacturing processes for airplane
assembly. We also review specific production planning tools such as the
number one flow chart, the muscle charts, the master schedule and the crew
size studies.
2.2 Description
The assembly of an airplane entails a series of manufacturing processes which
are organized as a network of concurrent and merging flows. These
manufacturing processes are in turn made up of operational work units or
departments called control codes. These control codes, staffed with varying
numbers of line employees, have responsibility for performing pre-assigned
tasks within the manufacturing process. For example, a control code might be
responsible for joining the completed left and right wings to the wing stub
section of the airplane fuselage (wing-stub join). The control codes each
perform specific, pre-assigned tasks on individual incoming jobs for a
specified period of time called the manufacturing flow time.
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Within the context of this thesis, manufacturing flow time1 is defined
as the time2 required within a control code to perform required tasks. That is,
the control code flow time is the length of time that an airplane will remain
in a specific control code. The operations performed by these control codes
varies from tasks as simple as finishing the surface of an airplane wing to
tasks as complex as integrating the major body sections of the entire airplane.
The time required by each control code to complete its pre-assigned tasks,
however simple or complex, is defined as the control code flow time. Note
that each control code within the manufacturing sequence can have a
different flow time.
The production cycle time3 is defined as the time4 elapsed between
consecutive job completions or airplane deliveries for a control code or for
the entire manufacturing system, respectively. Unlike manufacturing flow
time, all control codes within the manufacturing system must operate at one
production cycle time. An airplane manufacturer operating at a three day
production cycle completes and ships an airplane from the production line
every three days. Consequently, every control code in the manufacturing
sequence must also complete work on an airplane every three days (no matter
what the individual flow time of the control code is). So, every three days, an
in-process job is completed by each control code in the manufacturing process.
Correspondingly, every three days, a new job enters each control code in the
1Within some industries, flow time is also known as cycle time or lead time.2Time is measured in normal work days, known within Boeing as manufacturing days or M-days.
3Also known as production cycle rate. These two terms will be used interchangeably throughout
the thesis.
4Also measured in normal work days or M-days.
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4manufacturing process. Note that a control code's flow time is often a
multiple of the production cycle time, although this is not always the case.
Difference Between Flow Time and Cycle Time
To illustrate the difference between flow time and cycle time, consider a
control code which has eight days of flow time and operates on a four day
production cycle. In this case, the control code is given eight days to complete
required tasks on each job and is required to ship a completed job out of the
control code every four days. To do so, the control code must work on more
than one airplane at a time. If the operations within the control code require
special tooling positions, then more than one tooling position must be made
available in order for the control code to work on each individual job for
eight days and ship a completed job out of the control code every four days .
Therefore, associated with control code flow time and production cycle rate is
the number of job or tool positions required within each control code to
operate within the given flow times and production rate.
The number of job or tool positions required within a control code
given flow time and production rate is simply the quotient of the control code
flow time divided by the production cycle time (job or tool position is equal to
quotient plus one if the remainder of the division is non-zero). So, for the
control code above with eight days flow time operating on a four day
production cycle, the number of job or tool positions is equal to 8/4 = 2
positions. Thus, while there are always two jobs in process at the control
code, each job spends eight days at the control code and a completed job is
shipped out every four days (see Figure 1.) Similarly, for a control code with
18
eight days of flow time operating on a three day production cycle, the number
of job or tool positions is equal to (8/3 = 2) + 1 = 3 positions.
Job
number
Job #4
Job #3
Job #2
Job #1
Delivery Delivery Delivery Time
Figure 1: Illustration of Flow Time versus Production Cycle Time
Number One Flow Chart
The number one flow chart outlines the exact sequence of every control code
in the airplane manufacturing process 5 (see Figure 2). The number one flow
chart specifies not only the sequence of the control codes but also the flow
time and start and stop dates for each control code (note that in Figure 2, the
length of the jobs equals the flow time for the control code).
5 There is a new number one flow chart for each new airplane program, model derivative, or new
production rate.
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Master Schedule
While the number one flow chart outlines the sequence of control code
operations for each airplane, the master schedule shows the sequence of
control code operations for multiple airplanes. The master schedule is a
graph depicting the status (control code and position load/unload) of every
airplane in the manufacturing process for a specified time frame (see Figure
3).
As we see, the horizontal axis of the master schedule shows normal
work days while the vertical axis of the master schedule represents specific
airplane unit numbers. Each diagonal line in the master schedule represents
a control code in the manufacturing process. A glance at the master schedule
reveals a great deal about the production plan. First, the space between
consecutive dots (called delivery points) for the same airplane represents the
length of time that each airplane will remain in a specific control code (flow
time). Second, the production cycle time is reflected in the master schedule as
the elapsed time between consecutive airplane delivery points from the same
control code (the production cycle time is thus the slope of the airplane
delivery line). Third, changes in control code flow time are easily detected on
the master schedule by examining the convergence or divergence of formerly
parallel-running delivery lines (change of spacing between delivery points).
Fourth, changes in the production cycle rate are easily detected on the master
schedule by changes in the slope of the delivery lines. An increase in the
slope of the delivery line (airplanes/time) indicates an accelerated production
cycle. Similarly, a decrease in the slope of the delivery line indicates a
decelerated production cycle.
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Estimating Manufacturing Work Statements
The manufacturing work statement details the necessary work to be
performed for a specific job in a control code. These work statements outline
the exact tasks and respective sequences that these tasks must be performed
in. The Estimating unit (part of the Industrial Engineering department)
estimates the direct labor input required to complete pre-assigned tasks
outlined in the manufacturing work statements by using one of two possible
estimating methods: parametric estimating or detail estimating.
Parametric estimating is a methodology which uses specific product
attributes (or parameters) such as weight, length, or performance to predict
product cost. The sensitivities of these parameters to total product cost are
determined by historical relationships through statistical regression analysis.
This methodology is good for first cut, macro level cost estimates and is
usually used to estimate costs for major sub-systems or an entire airplane. An
example of parametric estimating could be to use labor hours per pound to
predict airplane manufacturing cost; or, to use historical learning curve
values and the number one unit hours (calculated by using the projected
weight of the airplane to estimate the number one unit hours) to predict the
labor hours required to assemble the one hundredth airplane.
The second methodology utilized by the Estimating unit is called detail
estimating. Detail estimating is usually done for specific components where
the required operations and related sequences can be determined beforehand.
22
As an example, a detail estimate of the drill operations needed for a complex
machined part might be calculated as followed.
Detail Estimate for Drill Operations 6
Get part from skid
Load on drill jig
Place plastic shield
Drill six holes
Put shield aside
Shaving to barrel
Blow off chip
Unload part from jigs
Put part on skid
Base time
Personal, fatigue and delay
(PF&D) allowance of 15%
Standard time
0.1 min
1.25 min
0.15 min
2.90 min
0.1 min
0.65 min
0.15 min
0.9 min
0.2 min
6.4 min
0.96 min
7.36 min
Crew Size Study
The flow time of a control code is determined by the estimated work hours
(calculated from the manufacturing work statement) and the crew size of the
control code. The crew size of a control code is in turn determined by crew
size studies conducted for each control code. The crew size studies analyze a
total of four alternate control code crew configurations: minimum crew,
optimum crew, maximum crew and peak crew.
6 From Industrial Engineering in the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company p.66.
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The minimum crew size is the minimum number of shop workers
that should be stationed at a particular control code to sustain a minimal
working production schedule. The minimum crew can be used during slow
production periods to minimize the number of shop workers in the factory.
The optimum crew size, which is larger than the minimum crew, gives the
number of shop workers at the control code when individual worker
productivity is maximized. This is the crew size where the direct labor input
per job is at its lowest (because of the maximum individual worker
productivity utilized by the given crew size).
The maximum crew size gives the maximum number of workers at a
control code that can be "economically used to perform the production
work." 7 The individual worker productivity at the maximum crew is lower
than that at the optimum crew because the greater number of workers at the
control code reduces available work space and impedes individual worker
effectiveness.
The peak crew size, which is even larger than the maximum crew size,
gives the number of workers at the control codes that can be utilized to
minimize control code flow time. The peak crew size is determined as the
number of shop workers where incremental worker productivity is zero (that
is, adding another worker to the peak crew will not reduce the flow time of
the control code.)
7From Industrial Engineering in the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company.
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Lifeline Study
For each control code, a lifeline study is performed to determine the
minimum flow time necessary to perform pre-assigned tasks. The lifeline
study is conducted with peak work crew and is used to analyze the bottleneck
constraints of the pre-assigned tasks in the control codes (such as limiting
sequential flow of process) which limits minimum flow. For example, in the
"Clean, Seal and Paint" (CS&P) operation in the manufacturing process, peak
crew can speed up some specific labor intensive aspects of the operation such
as sealing and painting; however, the curing process for the sealing and
painting operations are fixed for a given process regardless of the number of
workers working in the control code. Thus, the curing time of the sealing
and painting process would be included in the limiting flow of the control
code lifeline.
An example
Now, let us integrate all the aforementioned tools in an example. Suppose
that by using the manufacturing work statement, we estimate that for a
particular control code the number one production unit (i.e. the very first
airplane) will require eight hundred labor hours to assemble a plane at the
control code. Assume that crew size studies determined that the optimal
crew size is ten workers per job. The production line is currently operating
on a five day production rate. Given these, how do we plan the production
process for this control code?
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Using present planning methodology, we determine that the number
one unit flow time for the control code8 is 800 hours/(10 workers * 8 hours
per worker-day 9) = 10 days. Given the five day cycle rate, we calculate that the
number of tool positions required at the control code is equal to 10/5 = 2
positions. So, the control code will initially have twenty workers 10 at the
control code working on two jobs for ten days each. The control code will
complete work on a job every five days (see Figure 4).
Job
number
Job # 3
Job # 2
Job # 1 .
1 5 days
4- -Flow time -a
10 days
Delivery Delivery Delivery Time
Figure 4: Sample Control Code Schedule
Now, because of improved worker productivity, suppose that the labor
input per job has decreased from eight hundred labor hours per job for unit
number one to eighty labor hours per job for unit number 256. How do we
plan the production of unit number 256?
8 Using optimal crew size to minimize labor required per job.
9 Assuming single shift operation.
1 0There are ten workers per tool position. Since there are two tooling positions, the control code
has twenty workers.
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For unit 256, we see that one possible scenario is keep the number of
flow days at ten and to decrease the control code head count from twenty to (2
* (80 hours / (ten days * 8 hours per worker-day) ) ) = 2 workers. With this
scenario, the number of tools required remains at two. Alternately, we can
decide to operate with five flow days in the control code and reduce the
number of workers to (80 hours / (5 days * 8 hours per worker-day) ) = 2
workers (see Figure 5). Notice that even though the number of workers
remain the same, the number of tools required at the control code decreases
from two to one. As we will see later, these two different scenarios have
significant implications on total product cost.
Job
number
Job # 3
Job # 2
Job # 1 5dy5 days
Flow time
5 days
Delivery Delivery Delivery Time
Figure 5: Sample Control Code Delivery Schedule
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2.3 Organizational Impact on Production Planning
In the above example, we see that by using available planning tools
differently, the production planning group can propose drastically different
production plans that are responsive to management focus on labor
productivity and schedule adherence. However, as we will show in the next
chapter, maximizing labor productivity alone by staying at optimal crew (and
the flow time implied by the optimal crew size) can actually decrease
corporate profitability because of flow time cost.
2.4 Conclusion
As we see in this chapter, the process of planning and coordinating a complex
production process such in an airplane manufacturing plant requires
extensive knowledge, experience, and coordination. In this chapter, I have
outlined and described only some of the many different tools that Boeing's
Industrial Engineering group uses to plan and coordinate this complex
production process. In the next few chapters, we will see how lack of flow
time cost visibility results in production plans that emphasized reduction of
worker head count and preservation of manufacturing flow time. I show that
these production plans, while successful in minimizing worker head count
and assuring schedule adherence, sometimes resulted in longer process flow
times and decreased corporate profitability.
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FLOW TIME COST
3.1 Introduction
In Boeing's management accounting system, there is presently no visibility of
flow time cost. In this chapter, I present the motivation for understanding
flow time cost and detail three primary components of this cost: 1) inventory
carrying cost, 2) revenue opportunity cost, and 3) variable tooling cost. Next, I
discuss how the lack of flow time cost visibility causes the present production
planning methodology to over emphasize head count reduction at the
expense of flow time and detail how these decisions adversely affect
operational profitability. I then propose a near term flow time reduction
strategy to reverse the effects of these decisions. Finally, I recommend that
flow time cost be incorporated into the production planning methodology.
3.2 Motivation
Within Boeing management, adherence to schedule is considered
paramount. This is partly due to the significant cost penalties involved when
airplane deliveries are delayed. The sequential nature of the manufacturing
process work flow dictates that upon completion of each production cycle,
each job in the production line must advance to the next control code in the
manufacturing sequence. This is because the delay of a single job within the
sequential manufacturing process could disrupt the work flow on the
production line and postpone the delivery of every successive airplane by the
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length of the delay. Presently, if a job is not completed within the allotted
flow time, the incomplete job is nevertheless moved on to the next control
code so that all following airplanes in the production line can proceed to their
next respective control codes. The offending late airplane will then have two
separate crews working on it during the manufacturing flow time in the next
control code. One of the teams working on the airplane will be the regular
crew of the new control code, the other is a special crew from the previous
control code sent over to complete all remaining incomplete tasks from the
previous control code. These incomplete jobs, called "travellers", are
monitored very closely by manufacturing management. Thus, the prevailing
attitude within manufacturing is to protect schedule jealously because of the
huge cost involved. This philosophy has resulted in manufacturing practices
which emphasize "Just-in-case" instead of "Just-in-time". One of the results
of these practices is the lengthy flow time present in the current
manufacturing process.
Manufacturing Flow Time Cost Visibility
In Boeing's management accounting system, there is little recognition of cost
associated with manufacturing flow time. The lack of flow time cost
visibility, coupled with the importance of completing jobs to schedule (while
maintaining the capability to manage unforeseen disruptions) and close
management scrutiny on work force head count, all contribute to the present
practice of reducing work force head count while preserving manufacturing
flow time. Consequently, as the total labor required to perform pre-assigned
manufacturing tasks within a control code decreases because of worker
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learning, current production planning methodology relies heavily on worker
head count reductions to realize learning curve benefits, while at the same
time preserving manufacturing flow time in order to insure that control
codes can adhere to tight production schedules and be protected against
unforesleen disruptions.
This methodology, which does not fully take flow time cost into
account during the production planning process (see section 3.3 for discussion
on components of flow time cost), actually increases manufacturing cost
significantly when applied within a high capital, high inventory
environment such as Boeing's final assembly process. In this thesis, I propose
an alternate production planning methodology, one which does take into
account the cost of manufacturing flow time and still operates within the
requirement of strict schedule adherence.
Specifically, I suggest that in most instances within the manufacturing
environment, flow time buffering is not the only method available to protect
against unforeseen disruptions. I suggest that in certain instances, increases
in labor head count and/or capital investments are just as effective as flow
time buffers in protecting against the effects of unforeseen disruptions. In the
proposed methodology, we evaluate and compare production alternatives
(such as increased labor head count and/or additional capital investments),
which are comparably capable of protecting the production schedule from
disruption, against the alternative of flow time buffering.
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3.3 Flow Time Cost Elements
Given the definition of flow time in section 3.2, in this section I show that
there are three significant elements of cost associated with manufacturing
flow time. Specifically, I show that flow time cost is composed of three major
cost elements: 1) inventory carrying cost, 2) revenue opportunity cost, and 3)
variable tooling cost.
Inventory Carrying Cost
The first element of flow time cost is the opportunity cost of money associated
with carrying the value of the work-in-process (WIP) inventory for the
duration of the control code flow time. I call this opportunity cost the
inventory carrying cost (recognizing that this cost is only a subset of the more
general definition of inventory carrying cost which also includes the
opportunity cost of carrying raw materials and finished goods).
The inventory carrying cost arises as follows. By having money
invested in inventory, a company loses the use of its money for the duration
of the manufacturing flow time. Since the minimum return of the
company's money is simple interest (such as bank CDs), each flow day the
work-in-process (WIP) inventory is being worked on in the manufacturing
process costs the company, at the very least, simple interest expense on the
full value of the WIP inventory1 . Because inventory carrying cost is a
function of inventory value, this component of flow time cost varies with
1 Inventory carrying rate should also include storage cost, insurance, spoilage and obsolescence,
and overhead.
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flow time as value is being added during each flow day of the manufacturing
process (see figure 2).
Calculating Inventory Carrying Cost
Calculating inventory carrying cost for a manufacturing process requires
detailed, precise information regarding cost-adding activities ongoing within
the manufacturing process. Specifically, to calculate inventory carrying cost
for each day within the manufacturing process, we must know the labor
required to complete assigned tasks within each control code, the relative
sequence of all control codes and the flow and costs of all parts and sub-
systems into the manufacturing process. With this information, daily
inventory carrying cost for each control code (and for each manufacturing
day) can be easily calculated.
An example
Given a cumulative product cost curve (or value-added curve) as shown in
Figure 1, how do we calculate the product's inventory carrying cost
component of flow time cost?
We can calculate the inventory cost curve for this product for every
flow day of the manufacturing process by making use of the formula below:
Inventory carrying cost for flow day t= WIP inventory at flow day t *
inventory carrying rate
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or, in simplified notation:
ICC (flow day t)= WIP (flow day t) * ICR (Equation 3.1)
Applying this equation for every point on the cumulative product cost
curve2, we get the inventory carrying cost profile as shown in Figure 2. Not
surprisingly, we see that the inventory carrying cost curve has the identical
shape as the cumulative product cost curve since the inventory carrying cost
for a particular flow day is simply the cumulative product cost for that flow
day multiplied by the inventory carrying rate. Note that Figure 2 is calculated
in terms of inventory carrying cost per plane.
Culmulative Product Cost
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Cost ($K) $200
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$50
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Flow time (months)
Figure 1: Cumulative Product Cost Curve
2 Assuming annual inventory carrying rate at 25%.
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Figure 2: Inventory Carrying Cost ($/Airplane)
Revenue Opportunity Cost
In a market where there is immediate substantial demand for a company's
product, there is a second element of cost associated with manufacturing flow
time called revenue opportunity cost. Revenue opportunity cost is the
potential revenue opportunity associated with collecting incoming sales
revenue earlier if a shorter product flow time can be realized (deliver earlier).
For example, in the airplane industry, demand for airplanes currently far
exceeds supply. Boeing commercial airplane group currently has an $85
billion, four year order backlog3 . An airline ordering a Boeing 747-400 today
will not get delivery of the airplane until approximately 19974. Given current
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4 Boeing News.
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market conditions 5 , with airline passenger traffic predicted to grow at over 4%
annually for the next decade 6 , airline customers are eager to take delivery of
newly designed, fuel efficient airplanes as quickly as possible. Given this
market environment, there are significant revenue opportunity benefits
associated with shorter product flow time (and earlier product delivery).
Flow Through vs. Flow Back
Before we calculate the revenue opportunity benefit of shorter flow time, let
us first discuss two possible implementations of flow time reduction.
Imagine that a control code within the manufacturing process which
presently has eight days of flow time (operating at a four day production rate)
reduced its flow time by one day. Implemented in isolation, the one day flow
time reduction at the control code brings about no tangible benefits to the
operation. This is because the one day flow time reduction, implemented in
isolation, has simply created a one day buffer inventory at the particular
control code. To realize the benefits of flow time reduction, the inventory
buffer must be either "flow through" or "flow back" the manufacturing
process.
By "flow through", we mean that the one day reduction is pushed
through all the subsequent control codes in the manufacturing process. To
accomplish this, all the control codes following the present control code must
5 This chapter was written prior to the 1991 Iraq-Kuwait crisis, which has had significant
short term impact on airline operations and profitability due to increasing oil prices (up to 30%
price increases in jet fuel prices) and decreasing passenger traffic (because of terrorist threats).
The long term effects of the crisis on airline operations is not clear.
6 Boeing News.
36
compress their schedule (by the amount of the flow time reduction) on the
very first airplane when the flow through is to occur. Note that the
compression for all subsequent control codes occurs only for the very first
airplane during the flow through process. Thereafter, the schedules for all
subsequent control codes are thereby advanced by one day. However, since
there are no changes in either the flow time nor the production cycle time for
these control codes, all these control codes would simply experience a one day
compression for the first airplane when the flow time reduction is flowed
through; after that, the control codes should continue to operate as normal,
one day ahead of the schedule it would be following under the previous,
longer flow time.
Flow Through Illustration
To illustrate, let us look at Figure three below. Figure three is a sample
production schedule for a hypothetical sequential job shop I have constructed
to illustrate how flow time reductions can be flowed through the
manufacturing process. From the figure, we see that the manufacturing
process consists of three sequential control codes, control codes A, B, and C.
We see that the manufacturing flow time for control codes A, B, and C are
five days, four days, and five days, respectively. From the schedule, we learn
that the production line is operating at a three day production rate (a product
is completed every three days). Note that for the first two jobs in the
production schedule, a new job is started and a completed job is shipped out
every three days. Assume that during a flow time reduction effort, the work
team at control code A found a one day flow time buffer that it can reduce
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from its present flow time. How do we flow through this one day flow time
reduction?
Table 1 below lists the start and completion dates for each of the control
codes for all five jobs. Note that on job number four, where the flow time
buffer is actually taken out of control code A and flow through the
manufacturing process, control codes B and C had to accelerate their
production schedules to "flow through" the flow time reduction (the dates in
parenthesis listed in Table 1 are the pre-accelerated start and completion dates
for each control code under the previous, longer flow time). We see from
both Figure 3 and Table 1 that after the one time schedule acceleration to flow
through the flow time reduction, control codes B and C settle back to their
regular production pace, starting and completing each job after the first
flowed through job (job number four in the example) one day ahead of the
old schedule. Note that this analysis applies similarly to a more complicated
manufacturing process involving parallel flow of sequential manufacturing
processes. The only difference occurs when the control code where flow time
is reduced is positioned before the integration point (where the parallel
processes converge). In this case, all parts in the parallel process flow that will
be integrated into the first flowed through job will also need to have their
schedules accelerated in order to synchronize arrival time at the process
integration point.
38
QNz...
-IziIs
0 5 10 15
Time (day)
20 25
Figure 3: Production Schedule to Illustrate "Flow Through" Concept
Control Code A Control Code B Control Code C
Start Date Cmpletn Start Date Cmpletn Start Date Cmpletn
Date Date Date
0 4 5 8 9 13
3 7 8 11 12 16
6 10 11 14 15 19
9 12(13) 13(14) 16(17) 17(18) 21(22)
12 15 16 19 20 24
Table 1: Start and Completion Dates for Five Jobs in Production Schedule
Advantages and Disadvantages of Flow Through versus Flow Back
Instead of flow through, the company can choose to "flow back" the
inventory buffer of the flow time reduction. That is, given the flow time
reduction, all upstream control codes can start one day later than the old
schedule and still be able to meet current delivery schedule. Since flow back
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simply requires that upstream control codes start later, there is no
compression of the schedule and implementation is far easier than flow
through. However, since flow through shifts the production schedule ahead
by the length of the flow time reduction, flow through achieves revenue
opportunity cost savings as well as inventory carrying cost savings (for a
manufacturing process involving parallel processes, revenue opportunity
costs savings can only be achieved if the flow time reduction is for a control
code on the critical path of the manufacturing process). On the other hand,
flow back simply takes advantage of the flow time reduction by pushing back
the starting date of the production schedule, thus helping the company only
to reduce inventory carrying cost and not realize any revenue opportunity
cost savings.
To summarize, a company can choose to either flow through or flow
back flow time reductions. By choosing to flow through flow time reductions,
a company will have to accelerate the production schedule for a pre-selected
job in order to flow the flow time buffer through the manufacturing process.
Once accomplished, all control codes (except the control code where the flow
time reduction took place) in the manufacturing process will operate with the
same flow time at the same production rate. The only noticeable difference
will be that the production schedule will be shifted forward by the length of
the flow time reduction that is flowed through the manufacturing process.
By flowing through flow time reductions, a company will have to plan
production carefully in order to account for the schedule compression for the
first flowed through job. However, because flow through shifts the
production forward by the length of the flow time reduction, flow through
allows the company to realize revenue opportunity cost savings as well as
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inventory carrying cost reductions. Flow back, because it only involves
delaying the starting date of every job after a designated flow back job, is very
simple to implement. However, because flow back utilizes the flow time
reduction by delaying the start dates, there are only inventory carrying cost
savings and no revenue opportunity cost reductions. Put in other terms, a
company can choose to implement the flow time reduction by either
delivering earlier (flow through) or starting later (flow back).
Calculating Revenue Opportunity Cost
Calculating revenue opportunity cost for an airplane program requires
knowledge of present production cycle rate, selling price of the aircraft,
customer pre-payment factor (if applicable), and relevant interest rates. Note
that revenue opportunity cost (benefits) only exist on control codes which are
on the critical path of the manufacturing sequence. That is, in order to
improve the revenue opportunity element of flow time cost, the flow time
for the entire product must be reduced and the income revenue stream
brought forward (flow time reduction is flowed through the manufacturing
process); thus, a reduction of the flow time for a control code that is not on
the critical path of the manufacturing process does not reduce the product
flow time and will not improve the revenue opportunity benefit of the
product. Also, as previously noted, flow time reductions that are flowed back
the manufacturing process will only bring about inventory carrying cost
savings but not revenue opportunity benefits.
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An example
Assume that manufacturing flow time for a much demanded product is ten
months. Further assume that the product sells for $100 each and that the
factory is operating at full capacity and has a two year order backlog. Thus,
when a customer orders this product, the customer would not get delivery of
the product for at least two years. Now, suppose that the company is
considering a proposal to reduce its product flow time from ten months to
nine months. What is the revenue opportunity benefit of this one month
flow time reduction?
The revenue opportunity benefits 7 of the flow time reduction can be
calculated as follows. If the company flows the flow time reduction through
the manufacturing process, it would be able to ship product to each of its
customers a month earlier. This flow time reduction will therefore, from a
cash flow standpoint, enable the company to collect its $100 revenue from
each of its customers a month earlier than under the current, longer flow
time. This shift in the revenue stream generates revenue opportunities for
the company in the form of either simple interest or internal investments.
Variable Tooling Cost
Variable tooling cost is especially important in Boeing's high capital, labor
intensive manufacturing environment. This element of flow time cost is
associated with the cost of purchasing and servicing required production tools
7 The one month flow time reduction will also bring about inventory carrying cost savings (see
section on inventory carrying cost).
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Uand equipment within the control codes in the manufacturing sequence. As
noted previously, the number of job or tooling positions required in a control
code is determined by the quotient of the control code flow time divided by
the maximum cycle time (plus one if the remainder of the division is non-
zero). For example, if control code 123 (a hypothetical control code) has eight
days of flow time and is operating on a four day production cycle, the number
of tooling positions (and in-process jobs) in the control code is equal to 8/4 =
2. If, on the other hand, the production rate needs to be increased to a three
day production cycle (a completed job from each control code every three days
instead of every four days), a new tool would have to be purchased and
installed at the control code because the number of tooling positions required
by control code 123 to meet the requirements of the new three day production
environment is now (8/3 =2) +1 = 3 (we add one to the quotient because the
remainder of the division is non-zero).
Now, suppose that the control code flow time can be reduced to six days
(we will discuss near term and far term flow time reduction strategies later in
this thesis), then the tooling requirement for the control code would remain
at two (6/3 = 2) and the additional tooling position would no longer be
needed. Therefore, we see that significant tooling cost reductions can be
achieved through control code flow time reduction.
Calculating Variable Tooling Cost
Calculating variable tooling cost for a control code requires an estimate of the
incremental tooling cost, the planned maximum production cycle rate for the
airplane program, and the projected control code flow time based on the
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present production planning methodology. Note that variable tooling cost
(and savings) occur in a step-wise manner (see Figure 4). This is because the
incremental tooling cost being evaluated increases as steps (a function of the
production cycle time). For instance, in the example above, a one day flow
time reduction in control code 123 (bringing the control code flow time to
seven days), is of no value within the variable tooling cost dimension 8 since a
one day flow time reduction will not decrease the number of tools required at
the control code (the number of tooling positions required at the control code
is (7/3 = 2) + 1) = 3 positions.)
An example
To demonstrate a variable tooling cost calculation, we will use the control
code above that is operating with eight days of flow time in a four cycle
production cycle (a completed job every four days). Assume that because of
market conditions, the factory wants to accelerate the production rate to a
three day production cycle (a completed job every three days).
As we saw earlier, going from a four day production rate to a three day
production rate will necessitate purchase and installation of a new tool since
the number of tooling positions required by the control code will increase
from 8/4 = 2 positions to 8/3 = 2 + 1= 3 positions. We will assume that the
incremental tooling cost is $1.2 million dollars. What is the variable tooling
cost (benefit) for flow time reduction at this control code?
8 The one day flow time reduction does bring about inventory carrying cost savings for the control
code.
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In this example, if we do not reduce manufacturing flow time at the
control code, we will need to purchase a new tool for $1.2 million in order to
produce at the faster three day production rate. If, however, we can reduce
manufacturing flow time at the control code, we may be able to produce at the
faster production rate without purchasing a new tool, thereby realizing
significant variable tooling cost savings. To calculate the variable tooling cost
(benefit) of flow time reduction, we note that a one day flow time reduction
(bringing the control code flow time to seven days) will not reduce the need
for the new tool since the number of tooling positions at the control code is
still (7/3 = 2) + 1 = 3 positions. On the other hand, if we can reduce the flow
time at the control code by two days (bringing the control code flow time to six
days), we see that we no longer need to purchase the additional tool in order
to produce at the faster production rate since the number of tooling position
required now is 6/3 =2 positions (we already have two tools in the control
code since we are presently operating with eight flow days in a four day
production cycle, thus the number of tooling positions presently at the
control code is 8/4 = 2 tools). Since a one day flow time reduction brings
about no variable tooling benefit, but a two day flow time reduction brings
about $1.2 million in variable tooling saving, we see that the variable tooling
cost curve looks like a step function (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Variable Tooling Cost Curve
Flow Time Cost Integration
In the sections above, I have explained and derived each of the three major
elements of flow time cost. Benefits of flow time reduction can be assessed by
integrating these three elements together for the entire manufacturing
process and noting the benefits of flow time reduction for each flow day. The
integrated flow time cost is especially important when evaluating alternate
production planning decisions involving trades of capital and/or labor
investments for flow time (a detailed discussion on this methodology
follows; see near term flow time reduction strategy). Note that flow time cost
is best integrated by calculating in units of dollars per flow day per year
($/flow day- year) instead of dollars per flow day per airplane ($/flow day-
airplane). Using the $/flow day-year unit (which gives the dollars saved per
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year for each flow day reduction) facilitates evaluation of flow time reduction
proposals using the net present value (NPV) or pay back period
methodologies.
Intangible Elements of Flow Time Cost
In addition to the three flow time cost components noted in the previous
sections, there are intangible flow time costs as well. Long flow times in the
manufacturing process lengthen feedback on production problems and allow
these problems to accumulate in work-in-process inventory. Because of this,
more corrective efforts are expended to resolve the production problems and
rework all the parts that have built up in the work-in-process inventory.
In addition to lengthening the feedback process and increasing rework,
long flow times also decrease a company's capability to respond quickly to
shifting market demand. Because of long manufacturing flow time, a
company becomes very dependent on accurate sales forecasts in order to
produce products demanded by the market. If, however, market demand
shifts unexpectedly, a company with long manufacturing flow time will be
caught producing plenty of unwanted products and, because of its long
manufacturing flow time, will require a longer period of time to bring in-
demand products to market than competitors with short manufacturing flow
times.
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3.4 Implications of Flow Time Cost on Production Planning
Methodology
What are the implications of flow time cost on present production planning
methodology? What are the effects of flow time cost visibility on future
production decisions? In this section, we examine the effects of flow time cost
on present production planning methodology. Specifically, we examine the
implications of flow time cost on alternate ways of utilizing productivity
improvements.
Present Production Planning Methodology
At the start of a new airplane program, an initial number one airplane flow
chart is constructed depicting the sequence and length of all manufacturing
operations in the process flow based on product definition and on experiences
from past airplane programs. The staffing level necessary to initiate and
sustain production for each control code are then calculated based on
estimated labor hours and planned manufacturing flow days. In a
manufacturing environment where there is significant worker learning, the
labor input per job needed by workers to complete required operations within
each control code decreases as a function of the number of airplanes produced
(see Figure 5).
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Figure 5: Sample Learning Curve
As the labor hours required by each control code in the number one
flow chart decrease, the production planners have to decide how to utilize
-these productivity improvements. The improved labor productivity could be
utilized by reducing the number of workers at the control codes, reducing
control code flow time, or a combination of both. Currently, because of
management emphasis on work force head count as the primary tool of cost
control, and due to the lack of flow time cost visibility, production planners
rely heavily on head count reduction as the primary means of realizing these
productivity improvements, at the expense of flow time.
Proposed Production Planning Methodology
With visibility of flow time cost, I propose a new methodology for utilizing
worker productivity improvements. Specifically, I propose that as labor
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hours required by each control code decrease because of worker learning, that
these productivity improvements be realized through flow time reduction
instead of work force reduction 9 .
An Example
Assume that the first production unit of control code 856 (a hypothetical
control code) is estimated to require 100 labor -days. To meet requirements of
the 5 day production rate, the control code will initially operate with ten flow
days and (10/5 =) 2 tooling positions. There will initially be (100 labor-days
per job/5 day production cycle) = 20 workers working in the control code.
Through worker learning, by unit 256, the labor content required to complete
necessary operations will decrease to about 10 labor-days (however, because of
manufacturing variances, labor content can range up to 16 labor-days per
plane). Assume that because of projected market demand, the production
cycle rate will be increased to a two day cycle. Table 2 lists three alternate
scenarios of utilizing the productivity improvement benefits and their
respective impact on flow time, labor head count and tooling positions.
From Table 2, we see that the three scenarios have drastically different
average labor content per job. Specifically, scenario one, the scenario with
longest flow time, also has the lowest average labor input per job. To
understand this, let us look at the scenarios in more detail. In scenario one,
where the control code has ten flow days and five job positions, the control
code supervisor can shift workers between jobs (from easier jobs to harder
9Up to the limit dictated by minimum flow time and maximum crew size.
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jobs) and smooth the work variability between incoming airplanes1 0. On the
other hand, in scenario three, where the control code has only two flow days
and one job position, the control code supervisor must staff at a level capable
of completing even the most difficult jobs within the production schedule
(note that the labor content per job can range up to 16 labor-days per airplane).
To meet the production schedule, the supervisor in scenario three has to staff
the control code with (16 labor-days per job/2 day production cycle)= 8
workers (note that some of these eight workers may be idle when the work-
in-process job requires less than 16 labor-days).
These scenarios illustrate the difficult choices facing supervisors and
production planners on how they should utilize improved productivity. We
see that by realizing productivity improvements through head count
reduction, we maximize worker productivity (minimum labor content per
job). However, we may also forgo significant savings in inventory carrying
cost, revenue opportunity cost (if the control code is on the manufacturing
critical path) and variable tooling cost. On the other hand, by realizing
productivity improvements through flow time reductions, we bring about
significant flow time cost savings but we also lose some of the productivity
improvements. Under the present incentive system, which emphasizes
schedule adherence and worker head count (but does not recognize flow time
cost), production decisions are often made without considering flow time
cost. This has in turn resulted in production decisions which, while
minimizing labor content per job, do not maximize corporate profitability.
1 0Please see "How increased flow times reduce effects of job work variations" in chapter 5 for
detailed discussions.
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Realizing Productivity Improvements through:
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Flow Time 10 days 6 days 2 days
Cycle Rate 2 Days 2 Days 2 Days
Tooling Positions 5 positions 3 positions 1 position
Staffing 5 workers 5-6 workers 8 workers
Avg Input / Job 10 labor days 10-12 labor days 16 labor days
Inventory 126/5 = 25.2 126/3= 42 126/1 = 126
Turns1 1
Table 2: Three Different Ways to Realize Productivity Improvements
3.5 Near Term Flow Time Reduction Strategy
Given the discussions earlier on past production decisions that emphasized
head count reduction at the expense of flow time and given the motivations
toward flow time reduction, what can we do to reduce flow time? In this
section, I introduce the near term flow time reduction element of the dual-
prong strategy. Later in this thesis, I will introduce the far term flow time
reduction element of the strategy.
Methodology
To bring about near term flow time reduction, I propose a two step process.
First, I propose that the present flow time for all manufacturing control codes
be evaluated against their minimum theoretical flow time. This evaluation
would give an assessment of the opportunities available for flow time
1 1Inventory turn of control code calculated as annual output divided by average inventory.
Annual output calculated as 252/cycle rate = 252/2 = 126.
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reduction. Next, I propose that specific trades of head count and/or capital
investments for flow time reduction within each control code be evaluated
on the basis of incremental cost (marginal labor efficiency loss and/or capital
investment cost) and incremental benefits (flow time cost reduction through
reductions in inventory carrying cost, revenue opportunity cost, and variable
tooling cost).
For example, consider a control code, staffed with six workers (optimal
crew size), which is presently operating with twenty days of flow time in a ten
day production cycle12 . Thus, labor input is (6 workers * 10 days * 8 hours per
work day1 3) = 480 hours per job. The present operation minimizes labor
input per job by operating at optimal crew size14 while preserving
manufacturing flow time to protect against unforeseen disruptions. Now,
consider a proposal to reduce two days of manufacturing flow time at the
control code by adding two more workers. Now, the labor input per job is (8
workers * 10 days * 8 hours per day) = 640 hours per job. The increase in labor
hours per job is due to deviation from the optimal crew size (which reduces
labor productivity) and worker idle time between jobs.
Using the present production planning methodology, the flow time
reduction is a bad proposal since it increases the labor cost per job. However,
by incorporating flow time cost elements, this proposal might actually be very
beneficial since it reduces inventory carrying cost at the control code by two
days. In addition, if the control code is on the critical path of the
manufacturing sequence, and the flow time reduction is flowed through the
1 2Assuming eight hour, one shift-per day operation.
13 Assuming eight hour, one shift-per day operation.
14See chapter two for detailed explanation of production planning methodology, including
optimal crew size.
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manufacturing process, the flow time reduction proposal would also bring
about revenue opportunity cost savings.
Implications of Proposed Methodology on New Airplane Program
In a new airplane program, where facilities have not yet been built, the
proposed production planning methodology has significant impact. In
particular,the proposed production planning methodology, which places
renewed focus on flow time reduction as the primary means of realizing
productivity improvements, will bring about significantly shorter flow times
for control codes in the manufacturing sequence as the number of airplanes
manufactured increases. Therefore, as the product line gains market
acceptance and approaches maximum production rate, the lower flow time of
the new production planning methodology will translate to significantly
lower facilities and tooling costs, in addition to substantially reduced
inventory carrying cost and revenue opportunity cost. For a new airplane
program, where capital investments add up to hundreds of millions of
dollars and is not yet a sunk cost, the proposed production planning
methodology can bring about significant program savings.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we reviewed flow time cost and the three primary cost
elements of flow time cost. In addition, we discussed how lack of flow time
cost visibility in the current management accounting system has resulted in
production decisions that overemphasized head count reduction as the
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primary method for realizing productivity improvements, at the expense of
manufacturing flow time. Given these motivations, we presented a near
term flow time reduction strategy. Unlike the present production planning
methodology, the proposed strategy focuses on flow time reduction as the
primary method in realizing productivity improvements in the production
line. We showed that with the new flow time reduction strategy, we realize
the benefits of the labor productivity improvements and also significant flow
time cost savings.
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Chapter 4 ANALYSIS OF SYSTEM VARIANCE IMPACT ON
DIRECT MANUFACTURING LABOR INPUT
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I analyze the impact of system variances on manufacturing
labor input. Before proceeding to the analysis, let us define manufacturing
variance. In this thesis, variances are defined as "factors or elements within
the manufacturing environment which affect the execution of baseline
manufacturing operations." Examples of variances in the manufacturing
environment are engineering changes, part shortages, job rework, part
rejections, and various product options.
During my internship at Boeing, I learned first hand the impact of
system variances on manufacturing productivity. Interviews with
manufacturing supervisors, shop workers, and industrial engineers all
indicate that significant portions of total manufacturing labor input are
attributable to system variance-related activities. Mr. Deane Cruze, senior
corporate vice president of Operations at Boeing, noted in his article, Breaking
Out of the Box1 , that "We should be very concerned about our willingness to
do many jobs over and over again. Why is it that we never have time to do it
right the first time, but always have time to do it (rework) again?...We've
done a lot of things right. Imagine what we could do if we just quit doing a
few thing wrong."
1 Cruze, Deane. Breaking out of the Box, MANAGER - Boeing Management Magazine, Mar-
April 1990.
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In this chapter, I present a working hypothesis regarding the
effects system variances have on manufacturing labor input and give
definitions and descriptions of these manufacturing variances. I explain how
statistical methods are used to test the validity of the working hypothesis and
describe the actual procedures of the statistical regression analysis used for
hypothesis testing. Finally, I present and analyze the results of these statistical
regressions to determine the validity of the working hypothesis and to
estimate the effects of system variances on manufacturing labor input.
4.2 Working Hypothesis
My working hypothesis regarding the effects of system variances on
manufacturing labor input assumes that for each control code2 , there is an
associated manufacturing baseline work package which the control code is
required to complete as part of its function. Associated with this baseline
work package is the baseline work time3 which the control code workers need
to complete the required tasks. The baseline work time (BWT) of a control
code is a function of a number of factors including, among other things, the
complexity of the work to be performed and the number of airplanes
manufactured thus far 4. Therefore, the complexity of the baseline work
package plays a significant role in determining the initial time required to
complete pre-assigned tasks (called the number one unit time) while the
number of units manufactured and the slope of the learning curve play
2 Basic operational work units within Boeing final assembly operations. See Chapter 3 for
definition and example of control code.
3 1n units of labor-hours per job.
4 Learning curve effect. See chapter 5 for discussions on nature of learning curve.
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significant roles in determining the actual baseline work time required by
each control code to complete pre-assigned tasks for each airplane.
The working hypothesis assumes that the actual manufacturing time
spent by a control code to perform the required tasks is different from (usually
greater than) the BWT. This is because the workers at the control code, while
working on the baseline work package, have to contend with external system
variances such as engineering changes, part shortages, and part reworks
which disrupt the process work flow and add extra work to the baseline work
package. Therefore, these system variances change (usually increase) the labor
input required by each control code to complete its operations (Figure 1).
Rejects
Defects Engineering
changes
Customer Baseline
Introduction Manufacturing hours
Product
Part onfiguration
shortages
Worker
Learning
Figure 1: Working Hypothesis Illustration
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I propose that the actual manufacturing time required to complete the
baseline work package at each control code is equal to the sum of the BWT
and the cumulative effects of the various external system variances. I test the
validity of this working hypothesis by utilizing multivariate regression
analysis to assess whether the manufacturing system variances have any
statistically significant effects on the actual manufacturing labor input
expended by the control codes to complete their baseline work packages.
4.3 Data Collection Methodology
To test the validity of the working hypothesis, I studied the Boeing 767
airplane program. In order to perform the multivariate regression analysis to
test the working hypothesis, actual direct labor data and various system
variance data were collected for most control codes in the manufacturing
process for fifty consecutive Boeing 767 airplanes. Specifically, actual direct
manufacturing major assembly labor hours (called Control Code 3 hours5 )
were collected for the manufacturing control codes in the 767 manufacturing
sequence for fifty consecutive Boeing 767s. Similarly, data from over thirty
different sources of manufacturing variances were compiled for the same fifty
airplanes.
5 Note that this "control code" is a labor control code and is different from a manufacturing
control code, which is an operational work unit in the manufacturing process.
59
Major Shops
During data collection, we uncovered a difference in the way that data for
direct labor hours and data for the various system variances are kept.
Specifically, we discovered that the direct labor hours, recorded by the
manufacturing organization and collected by a group within the Finance
department, is recorded and stored at the control code level. That is, the
recorded hours expended by each control code for the manufacture of each of
the fifty airplanes are available in the history files. On the other hand, the
various system variance data, kept by a number of different organizations
(such as Engineering, Manufacturing, Quality, and Industrial Engineering),
are collected, aggregated, and reported by these organizations at what is called
the "major shop" level. These "major shops", which are aggregates of
multiple control codes in the manufacturing process, are the major
operational units of the manufacturing organization. The four major shops
within the manufacturing sequence are: 1) Body structures, 2) Wing
structures, 3) Join & Installations and Final Assembly, and 4) Field
Operations.
Because the manufacturing organization is structured along major
shops, the variance data, which are collected and reported to the senior
managers in charge of these shops, are aggregated together for all the
manufacturing control codes contained in these major shops and are recorded
and stored only at the major shop level. To insure compatibility of data, the
actual labor data for all the control codes are aggregated by using the same
method used by the Industrial Engineering organizations to aggregate the
variance data for the major shops.
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In addition, the data for the four major shops was aggregated to form a
data set appropriate for analysis at the airplane level. This was done in order
to get a macro view of the overall impact of system variance effects on
manufacturing direct labor input. Note that the actual labor input expended
for manufacturing each airplane are collected for each control code for
various labor hour control codes: cc3 (direct manufacturing hours), cc4
(rework hours), and cc5, cc6 and cc96 . However, because the data for labor
control codes cc5, cc6, and cc9 are collected on an aggregate monthly basis
rather than on a plane-by-plane basis, the analysis presented in this thesis will
only consider the effects of variance impact on the direct manufacturing labor
hours (cc3 hours).
System Variance Definitions
The definition and description of the system variances used in the statistical
regression analysis are given below.
Bluelines are out-of-sequence work. That is, when work
that is normally performed at a work station can not be
completed there because of changes in the manufacturing
plan, bluelines are generated for some other work stations
in the assembly line to perform the uncompleted work.
The bluelines in the regression are at the shop where the
blueline work is actually performed.
6 Labor control codes for vendor rework, etc.
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4.4
e Blueline
o Greenline
*PRR
eRR
o Rejection tag
Greenlines are extended rejectable conditions. When a
rejectable condition is found on an airplane, a rejection
tag is generated to bring attention to the defect. If, it is
determined, that the rejectable condition exists on other
airplanes on the assembly line, greenlines are generated
for these other airplanes so that rework can also be
performed on these airplanes. Similar to the blueline, the
greenline in this regression are the frequency count at the
shop where the greenline work is actually performed.
PRRs are production revision requests generated by the
manufacturing or engineering organizations to revise the
manufacturing plan of an airplane.
RRs (Rapid Revisions) are simple revisions to the
manufacturing plan that is estimated to require no more
than one hundred labor-hours to complete. Revisions
requiring more than one hundred labor-hours are
submitted as PRRs (which are subject to management
review).
Tags written by the Quality Assurance department when
parts or installations do not conform to standard and
require corrective actions and/or signoff by Engineering.
This variable is broken down into Engineering (rejection)
tags and Operation (rejection) tags. Engineering tags are
rejectable conditions attributable to engineering error
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9 Defect
" Customer defect
" Crew Rest (CR)
" New customer
introduction
(Class 1)
while Operations tags are rejectable conditions attributable
to Operations error
Tags written by Quality Assurance when a part or
installation does not meet drawing requirements. Defects
are different from rejection tags because for a defect,
corrective actions can be taken to make the part or
installation meet drawing specifications. This rework can
be accomplished without Engineering notification.
Similar to the rejection tags, defects are also broken down
into Engineering defects and Operations defects
Tags written by the customer while the airplane is
undergoing customer acceptance inspections. Similar to
defects, repairs can be made to drawing specifications
without Engineering notification.
This is an extra cost option available to airline customers
for a closed-off section within the airplane where the
airplane crew can sleep or relax.
Binary variable which denotes that a particular airplane is
being delivered to a new airline customer. Usually, this
signals Boeing that more time should be allocated to work
with the airline in inspecting and accepting the airplane.
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P'"__
* Customer
introduction
(Class 2, 3)
eLog 2 of
Unit number
*Faster cycle
eFaster cycle
unit count
Binary variables to denote different levels of customer
deliveries to existing airline customers. Class 2 denotes
existing airline customer, new airplane model (for
instance, United Airlines, an existing customer of the 767-
200, taking delivery of its first 767-300). Class 3 denotes
existing airline customer taking delivery of a previously
accepted model with minor modifications (for example,
American Airlines (AA) taking delivery of its third 767-
200, but this airplane is the first AA 767-200 with Pratt-
Whitney engines instead of GE engines).
This variable is created to model the learning curve
effect7. Value of variable is the log (base 2) of the unit
number of the airplane (e.g. airplane 276 will have log 2
variable value of 8.109.)
This is a binary variable created to model a production
rate increase that occurred within the airplane samples
used in the regression. Airplanes produced under the
slower rate have value of zero for this variable.
This variable is created to model possible accelerated
learning effects with the increased production rate. This
variable has value of zero for airplanes produced under
the slower production rate. For airplanes produced under
the faster rate, the variable is assigned the value of the
of Unit number in this chapter.
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7 See section on Log 2
I
e SOS shortage:
eMaster Change
(MC)
* Change Request
" Customer
Airline AB
airplane's relative position in the faster rate (e.g. the first
airplane produced at the faster rate has value of 1, the
second airplane has value of 2, etc). The faster cycle and
the faster cycle unit count variables are created to model
the possible accelerated learning under the faster
production rate.
This variable denotes the number of occurrences where a
part needed on the line is not available for installation.
The frequency count is tracked at the shop where the
shortages occurred.
Changes requested by the customer airline after the
manufacturing plan for the airplane has already been
completed. MC necessitates changes to the manufacturing
plan and may require modifications to the airplane if the
MC request is made after the airplane is already in
production.
This is similar to the PRR. Change requests are specific
requests for changes to the manufacturing plan that are
generated by engineering after reviewing an MC.
This is a binary variable used to denote an airplane with
engines that are not manufactured by GE or Pratt-Whitney
(the two most popular engine manufacturers). This
variable can also be used to identify airplanes delivered to
Airline AB since it is the only airline in the sample that
orders 767s with these engines.
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*Shop BFE
rejection
e Traveller
Buyer Furnished Equipment (BFE) are airplane
equipment purchased by the airline customers to be
installed on their airplane by Boeing. Examples of BFE
include the galley, the seats, and the lavatory. Shop BFE
rejection (used only at the J&I and Final Assembly shop
since this is where all BFE are installed) denote the
number of occurrence for each airplane when a BFE is
rejected due to quality problems. The rejected BFE can
then be reworked by Boeing or the BFE installation can be
postponed until new BFE arrive.
As its name suggests, travellers are jobs that are not
completed on time in the assigned control code that have
to travel to a subsequent control code in the
manufacturing process. Unlike bluelines, where the job is
travelled due to changes in the manufacturing plan,
travellers are jobs that have to be completed later because
they were not completed within the allotted flow time
(with no changes to the manufacturing plan). The four-
digit number preceding the traveller variable indicate the
shop where the travellers originated. The travellers in
the regression indicate the number of travellers
completed at each major shop (where the travelled tasks
are actually completed).
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4.5 Description of Regression Analysis
I conducted the regression analysis for the Boeing 767 on a statistical software
package developed by Abacus Software8 called StatViewTM. A total of five
separate analyses were run for the Boeing 767 program. The first analysis,
total airplane cc3 regression, is an analysis of variance impact on the entire
767 manufacturing process. The other four analyses are for assessing variance
impact on each of the four major shops in the manufacturing process: Body
structures, Wing structures, J&I (join and installation) and Final Assembly,
and Field Operations.
Consulting Internal Experts
Before starting the regression analysis, I consulted with engineers and
managers within Boeing's Industrial Engineering group to compile a list of
relevant manufacturing variances which affect the production line. With
this list, I worked with various organizations to collect and sort these data.
While running the regressions, I worked closely with my Boeing on-
site advisor and the senior manager of Boeing's Industrial Engineering group
at Everett to insure that the results of the analysis make sense and are
consistent with their experience. Initially, I used a simple linear regression
model, which incorporated all of the over thirty different system variance
variables I collected for the 767 program as independent variables, and
regressed all these variables against the dependent variable, cc3 hours. This
8 Abacus Software, Berkeley, California.
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methodology did not work well as many of the different variables were often
confusing each other in the regression, resulting in unsatisfactory solutions
from the regressions.
From this experience, I concluded that before I started another round of
regression analysis, I needed to understand what the critical system variances
are that most impact manufacturing labor input. Knowing these critical
variances, I can then begin the analysis by using these variances as the starting
set of independent variables in the regression and then gradually refining and
adding new variables to the starting set as necessary. So, to identify these
critical variances, I conducted interviews with numerous industrial
engineers, manufacturing managers, shop superintendents and factory
managers to ask them what they thought were the top five variables most
impacting the manufacturing labor input of the 767 program and each of its
four major shops. The input from these individuals, who are the most
experienced and knowledgeable people regarding the intricacies of the
manufacturing process, gave me valuable insights about the manufacturing
process. Their input also prioritized the list of variances which formed the
starting set of variables for the new statistical analysis.
Stepwise Regression
To complement the new starting set of variables, I also began using a different
regression model in StatViewTM called stepwise regression 9 . Stepwise
regression is a regression method which initiates each regression step by first
9 Stepwise regression is a feature contained within the StatView software package.
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calculating the F-ratio for each of the independent variables. The model then
selects the independent variable with the highest F-ratio10 and includes this
variable into the regression.
After incorporating the variable with the highest F-ratio into the
regression and calculating the corresponding ANOVA1 1 table, the model re-
calculates the F-ratios for all the remaining independent variables against the
regression residual. The model then selects the independent variable with
the highest F-ratio above the user-selectable threshold for inclusion into the
regression. Note that now the regression has incorporated two independent
variables. After incorporating the two variables with the highest F-ratios, the
model again calculate the ANOVA table and the root mean square (RMS)
residual. Note that after including each new variable into the regression, the
software re-calculates the coefficients and F-ratios of all the incorporated
variables to minimize the root mean square (RMS) of the residual. If, after
the incorporation of a new variable, an existing variable's F-ratio falls below
the user-selected F-ratio threshold, the variable with the F-ratio below the
threshold will then be removed from the regression.
Upon removing the previously included variable, the software re-
calculates the coefficients, F-ratios, ANOVA table and RMS residual for all
incorporated variables. As before, the model then calculates the F-ratio for all
the remaining unincorporated independent variables. If there are variables
with F-ratios above the user threshold, the variable with the highest F-ratio is
then selected and incorporated into the regression. This selection,
1 0The F-ratio, defined as MS Treatment / MS Error, is a measure which can be used to test the
null hypothesis that all coefficients in the regression have the same value. Please refer to
Engineering Statistics by Hogg and Ledolter for details.
1 1 ANOVA stands for Analysis-of-variance.
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incorporation, and re-calculation process will continue until all independent
variables with F-ratios greater than the user-selectable threshold are
incorporated into the regression model and all remaining unincorporated
independent variables have F-ratios below the user-selected threshold. Using
this methodology (with the user F-ratio set to 4.0), the stepwise regression
model will only select those independent variables whose F-ratios are above
the user-selected threshold. Using this model, along with the smaller starting
independent variable set, the problem with all of over thirty independent
variables confusing each other's effects in the linear regression model was
addressed.
Assessing Surprising Results
This methodology worked well except for a few instances when the regression
results defied reasonable expectations and experience (for example, rejection
tags having a coefficient of -35 labor-hours per rejection tag; that is, rejection
tags actually reduced manufacturing labor input!). In these instances, the
cross correlation matrix of the independent variables incorporated into the
regression was examined to determine if there were any significant
correlations among these variables. If there were, I examined the origin of
the correlated variables, and determined if these variables were actually
tracking the same system variance. If this was the case, Boeing engineers and
managers were consulted to determine which of the variables was most
appropriate to keep in the analysis, removed the other variable, and re-ran
the regression.
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A New Binary Variable
If I did not find a problem with the independent variables, I would also
consult with the industrial engineering group to determine why the
regression results were off. Through these consultation, significant insights
were gained about the manufacturing process and the statistical regression
model. In one case, we discovered that the problem with the regression
resulted from a one-time only problem with an airline customer's
malfunctioning airplane engine which significantly increased the labor hours
expended for that particular airplane. However, because of the rarity of this
type of incident, the incident was not tracked by any existing variables in the
factory and thus was not reflected in any of the system variances in the
regression.
Without proper account of the large deviation, the model tried to
account for this deviation with existing system variance variables during the
regression and significantly altered the sensitivity coefficients of all the
variances in order to minimize RMS residual of the regression. In this
particular case, after incorporating a new binary variable to account for the
one time, extra-ordinary event, the software correctly attributed the deviation
in labor-hours to the new variable during the regression and the coefficients
of the other variables became reasonably consistent with experience.
4.6 Analysis and Discussion of Statistical Regression
The solutions of the five regression analysis for the Boeing 767 are shown
below. The intercepts for each of these analyses were calculated as part of the
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regression (intercepts were not set to a fixed value). However, as each of these
intercepts represents an estimate of the number one unit hour for the
respective major shop, I am not including the intercepts in the variable tables
below (because of the proprietary nature of the number one unit hour).
With respect to the regressions, we see that a large portion of the
statistical variance in the major shop direct labor hours are accounted for (as
indicated by the high adjusted R-squared parameter of the regressions) by
some "vital few" manufacturing variances. Interestingly, the wing shop has a
relatively low adjusted R-squared parameter because (I suspect) the analysis
did not include work force skill and tool reliability indices (which are indices
which measure the average aggregate years of experience of the work force
and the uptime of the production tools, respectively) as independent
variables in the regression. Unlike the other shops, customer-specific
variances do not significantly affect the wing shop because wings are rarely
modified for customer airlines. As a result, the work force skill and tool
reliability indices should become very significant in the operation of the wing
shop. Worker skills and tool reliability indices were not incorporated because
neither of these indices were available by control code for the fifty airplanes. I
am not terribly concerned, however, about not getting a better fit on the wing
shop since the wing shop constitutes a very small portion of total labor hours
utilized for 767 manufacturing.
Log 2 of Unit Number
To model the effects of the learning curve in the regression, I used a new
parameter which I called "Log 2 of Unit number". This parameter is the
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logarithm (base two) of the cumulative production unit count. Classic
learning curve assumes a log-log relationship between the unit labor hours
and the cumulative production unit count:
log (unit labor hours) = x log (cumulative unit count) + log (constant) (Eq. 1)
where x, the slope of the learning curve, is the rate of worker learning (x
ranges in value between 0.6 to 0.9, depending on the industry.)
The log-log worker learning model, however, does not work well for
the statistical regressions used to analyze the effects of system variances on
direct manufacturing labor input. This is because my working hypothesis
assumes that
unit labor hours = a + bX + cY + ... + effect of worker learning (Eq. 2)
where a is the intercept of the regression, X and Y are frequency counts of
manufacturing variances, and b and c their respective coefficients.
Now, if we use cumulative production unit count to model worker learning
and we take the log of both sides of the above equation, we have
log (unit labor hours) = log (a + bX + cY+... + effects of worker learning) (Eq. 3)
As we see, taking the log of both sides of the unit labor hour equation changes
the equation to a non-linear equation that is not conducive to regression. To
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simplify the regression, I decided to use the Log 2 of unit number parameter
to model worker learning. This particular parameter is preferred over a
simple cumulative production unit parameter because the cumulative unit
number model assumes worker learning to be uniform for all production
units. On the other hand, the Log 2 unit number parameter weighs worker
learning much more heavily towards earlier production unit, thus more
accurately modeling the nature of the worker learning.
Using the Log 2 of unit number parameter to model worker learning,
the regression model becomes:
unit labor hours = a + bX + cY + ... + d*Log 2 (unit number) (Eq. 4)
Note that d, the coefficient of the Log 2 unit number parameter, can be
interpreted as the change to the unit labor hours when cumulative
production doubles. That is, whenever the cumulative production increases
two-fold, the unit labor hours decrease by d hours. Thus, the Log 2 unit
number parameter is quite different from the traditional learning curve
model (which assumes that unit labor input goes down by x% rather than d
hours when the cumulative production doubles).
Effect of Faster Production Rate
There was a production rate increase which took place during the
manufacture of the fifty airplanes. To assess the relative impact of the faster
production rate on the manufacturing labor input, I used two variables, faster
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production rate and faster production rate unit count, to model the effects of
the accelerated production schedule. The faster production rate variable is a
binary variable indicating whether a particular airplane was produced under
the faster production rate. The faster production rate unit count variable is an
integer variable indicating the relative unit count of the current airplane in
the faster production cycle. For example, if airplane 256 is the fiftieth airplane
produced under the faster production cycle, its faster production rate variable
will have a value of one and its faster production rate unit count variable will
have a value of fifty. On the other hand, airplane 125, which was produced
under the slower production cycle, will have values of zero for both of the
faster production rate variables.
I used two variables to model effects of the faster production cycle
because in the regression analysis, we are really trying to assess two separate
effects: the effects of worker learning for the entire manufacturing process and
the effects of the faster production rate. I did not use a single logarithmic
variable to model the effects of the faster production rate because the value of
this logarithmic variable will be indeterminate for airplanes produced under
the slower production rate.
Body Structures
The body structures shop is responsible for the assembly and integration of
major sub-sections of the 767 fuselage. In this environment, where labor
learning is significant, the shop is very sensitive to customer specific changes
and associated disruptions. This is because customer airlines often request
different interior specifications for their aircraft, which in turn affect the
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design and manufacture of different body sections and the associated
manufacturing labor required to complete required tasks.
Variance and ANOVA Tables
R: R-squared: Adjusted R- RMS Residual:
r I Isquared:
.984 .968 .96 430.6
Variable Coefficient (labor Std. Err F-ratio
Ihour/occurrence)
Faster production -1524.3 298.3 26.1
rate
Faster production 76.1 31.1 6.0
rate unit count
Master changes 379.9 95.3 15.9
PRR & RR 88.3 23.4 14.2
Engineering tags 83.6 19.8 17.7
Operation defects 0.34 0.17 3.8
Completed G /L 22.1 3.9 31.6
log2(x) of Unit -25168.7 5284.6 22.7
number
Discussion
The regression analysis for the body structures shop is unique in that the
regression demonstrates the significance of the faster production rate. As
indicated by the table above, the faster production rate had a beneficial effect
on the manufacturing labor input required to complete pre-assigned tasks in
the body structures shop. This might have come about because of the
accelerated learning of the work force under the faster production rate (for a
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fixed amount of time, the work force is working on more airplanes, thereby
increasing worker learning). However, as the positive coefficient of the faster
production rate unit count showed, the beneficial effect of the faster
production rate decreases as faster production rate unit count increases. This
is because gradually, the difference between the regular learning and the
accelerated learning, decreases as the unit count increases and the respective
labor hours approach minimum value.
From the table, we see that Master Changes, Production Revision
Requests (PRR) and Rapid Revisions (RR), Engineering rejections and
completed Greenlines all have significant impact on the total labor input of
the body structures shop. Interestingly, manufacturing labor time spent
working on the completed Greenline and Engineering rejections are charged
to a different labor code (cc4) from labor code cc3, which is the direct
manufacturing hours used in the regression as the dependent variable. So,
why do we see a sensitivity of cc3 hours to these two variables? One possible
explanation is that these variables have secondary effects which affect direct
manufacturing labor input.
Primary vs. Secondary Effects
A possible explanation for the non-zero coefficients for completed greenlines
and engineering tags, which are suppose to be charged to a separate labor code,
has to do with a new hypothesis regarding primary versus secondary effects of
external system variances. I suggest that each variance (defined as factors or
elements which affect the baseline work package) really has two associated
effects on the actual manufacturing time required to complete required tasks.
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First, there is the time required to actually perform the incremental work
added on by the variance. So, in the case of a defect, where a rejectable but
correctable condition is detected by the Quality Assurance department, the
labor input required to actually correct the mistake is the primary component
of the net effect of the defect on the total manufacturing labor input.
The variance, however, also has a secondary effect. This secondary
effect of variances has to do with the impact of the disruptions caused by these
variances on the work flow and the work force. For example, in the case of a
greenline, where a rejectable condition detected on an earlier airplane in the
production line is also present on the current airplane, the workers at the
control code where the greenline is to be completed would first have to search
for all specifically relevant paperwork instructing them on how to perform
the rework. After that, they would have to plan the additional work around
the existing work flow before they can actually perform the rework. All time
spent on these non-value adding activities caused by the presence of the
greenline is the result of secondary effects of variances. In this example, the
effects of the disruption associated with the greenline, which interrupted the
process work flow and disrupted worker learning, will have a significant
impact on the direct manufacturing labor input required to complete the
baseline work package. I call the effects of these associated disruptions of
external system variances on the direct manufacturing labor input the
secondary effects of variances.
Within the framework of the primary and secondary effects of
variances on manufacturing labor input, it is therefore not surprising to see
that greenlines and engineering rejections will still have an adverse effect on
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direct manufacturing labor input even after the actual labor expended to
correct these conditions are charged to another labor control code.
Wing Structures
I did not get as high an adjusted R-squared parameter in the wing shop as I
did with the other major shops. Unlike other shops, the wing shop, which is
responsible for the assembly and integration of the airplane wings, is not very
sensitive to customer variations. This is because wing designs are rarely
altered for specific customer airlines.
Variance and ANOVA Tables
R: R-squared: 
Adjusted R- RMS Residual:
.747 .559 .496 442.635
Variable Coefficient (labor Std. Err F-ratio
hour/ occurrence)
Customer A 813.5 274.6 8.8
Customer B -1043.1 469.2 4.9
4-day unit count -127.7 21.4 35.5
PRR & RR 436.5 105.8 17.0
log2(x) of Unit 16516.4 3145.6 27.6
number
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Discussion
Given the relative insulation of the wing shop from customer variations, the
direct manufacturing labor input should be relatively insensitive to labor
learning (the shop is already on the flat portion of the learning curve) and
very sensitive to skills index and tool reliability. Unfortunately, I did not
incorporate indices measuring relative labor experience and tool reliability 12.
Thus, I expect that once the skills index and tool reliability index are included
in the regression, the adjusted R-squared of the regression should improve.
It is interesting to note that the log 2 of unit number parameter in the
regression has a positive coefficient. This means that within the data sample,
unit labor hours increased as cumulative production units increased. While
this is counter to learning curve theory, I suggest that the positive coefficient
of the learning curve parameter is due to two factors. First, as the rate of
worker learning is high (because of the relatively few wing structure design
changes), the wing shop is already operating on the flat portion of the
learning curve. This makes the effects of the learning curve far less
pronounced than in the other major shops. Second, I suggest that the
positive coefficient of the learning curve parameter (log 2 of unit count) is
possibly reflecting a relative decrease in the level of worker experience in the
wing shop. As the shop is very sensitive to decreases in worker skill and
experience (which increases the labor input required to complete pre-assigned
tasks in the control codes within the shop) and these variables are not
12 These data are in fact available. However, the data are collected on a monthly basis by
shop and are available only in that form.
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reflected in any regression variables, the regression might have attributed
relative decreases in the worker experience to the learning curve.
join & Installations (J&I) and Final Assembly
The J&I and Final assembly shop is responsible for the join and integration of
the major sub-sections of the airplane fuselage and for the installation,
integration and testing of the major mechanical and electrical (including
engines and avionics) sub-systems into the airplane. In this shop, where
customer-to-customer variations significantly affect the tasks performed,
system variances have a major impact on the direct manufacturing labor
input of the J&I and final assembly shop.
Variance and ANOVA Tables
R: R-squared: Adjusted R- 
RMS Residual:
.984 .968 .955 478.44
Variable Coefficient (labor Std. Err F-ratio
hour/occurrence)
log2(x) of Unit -47132.1 3303.0 203.6
number
4610 Travellers 170.5 17.4 96.5
Engineering tags 7.8 5.2 7.2
Operations 3.4 0.32 112.7
defects
Customer defects 3.0 0.84 12.6
BFE rejections 431.2 72.75 35.1
4650 Travellers 19.8 5.2 14.5
4625 Travellers -56.9 7.2 63
Customer A 943.2 389.1 5.9
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Discussion
Of the significant variables, we see that several travellers (three in all) have
an impact on the direct labor input. While the positive coefficients for two of
the travellers are as expected, the negative coefficient of the 4625 traveller is
surprising. One possible explanation for the 4625 shop travellers' negative
coefficient, which are travellers within the J&I and Final assembly shop
(versus the other two travellers which are travellers to the Field operations
shop), is that when the area supervisor sees that a job is about to travel to the
next area within the J&I and Final assembly shop, he will likely send in the
most experienced work crew to work on the traveller. The work crew, who
are likely to work faster because of their superior experience and because the
traveller is under intense time pressure to be completed, are likely to have a
positive benefit on the total time required to complete the job.
We see that relative to the body structure shop, the sensitivity of the
operations defects and engineering tags are significantly higher and lower,
respectively. The defects in the J&I and final assembly area usually involve
more rework than the defects in the body structures shop because J&I and
Final assembly defects, since they occur later in the manufacturing process,
typically require removal of some previously installed parts before corrective
actions can be taken, thus taking more time. With respect to the engineering
rejections, engineering rejections in J&I and Final assembly occur more
frequently and involve smaller changes than the engineering rejections in
the body structures shop. In the body structures shop, engineering rejections
occur infrequently but have major impacts, thus the higher sensitivity of
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engineering rejections to direct labor input than the J&I and Final assembly
shop 13.
Noteworthy in the table are the customer defects and airline customer
A variables. The customer defects, which are defects detected by the customer
airline that must be corrected, are usually perceived to be relatively cosmetic
and part of the customer acceptance routine. Through the analysis, we see
that the customer defects do have significant effects on the manufacturing
labor input.
The airline customer A variable is noteworthy because while customer
airline variables are usually not included in the regression analysis because
effects of the individual airline customers are better reflected in direct impact
manufacturing variables such as customer defects, operations rejections, etc,
the airline variable was included in this regression to reflect a one-time,
extraordinary circumstance involving problems with the customer airline's
airplane engines, which caused the direct labor input to increase
substantially 14. Because the nature of this incident is not reflected in any of
the regular system variance variables, I incorporated the airline variable to
reflect the occurrence of the incident so that the statistical software can
properly account for the otherwise unexplained increase of the
manufacturing labor input related to the particular airplane.
13 Note that the effects for Engineering tags are secondary effects.
14 See unique variance variables earlier in this chapter.
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Field Operations
The field operations shop, which is responsible for flight test of the completed
aircraft, is very sensitive to customer-to-customer variations. Specifically, as
different customer airlines have very different acceptance procedures, the
time required to complete customer acceptance of airplanes varies greatly. In
addition, the field operations shop is also very sensitive to travellers from the
J&I and Final assembly shop because these travellers can substantially alter
the work flow of the baseline work package of the field operations shop.
Variance and ANOVA Tables
R: R-squared: Adjusted R- RMS Residual:
I I ~squared:II
.838 .703 .678 1893.91
Variable Coefficient (labor Std. Err F-ratio
_________ hour/ occurrence)
Customer Airline 3998.9 1049.5 14.52
Late BFE 1878.8 824.7 5.2
4610 Traveller 98.6 28.1 12.3
Discussion
As expected, the table shows that Field operation labor input is particularly
sensitive to incomplete jobs that travelled from the J&I and Final Assembly
shop out to the Field. In particular, we see that travellers and late BFE (Buyer
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furnished equipment) variables are found to be significant. The late BFE
variable (a frequency count variable) indicates that a buyer furnished
component, which was scheduled to be installed in the J&I and final assembly
shop, was late and had to be installed in the Field operations shop. We see
that late BFE have significant impact on the manufacturing labor input at the
field operations shop. The Customer Airline AB sensitivity reflects the
additional time required to work with the customer airline to flight test the
engines (non Pratt-Whitney or GE engines).
Total Airplane Regression
After performing the regressions for each of the major shops in the
manufacturing process, I aggregated the direct manufacturing labor hours and
the associated system variances for all four major shops to form a data set for
the entire manufacturing process. Thus, this analysis gives a macro view of
the significant variances for the entire airplane manufacturing process, not
just the individual shops. While the aggregation of the data may cause loss of
detail in the analysis, this regression should give us some sense of the
variances that most affect direct manufacturing labor input on the production
line.
Variance and ANOVA Tables
R: R-squared: Adjusted R- RMS residual:
I98 .6 9squared:
.982 1- .964 _T.958 _F 1696.072
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Source DF: Sum Squares: Mean Square: F-ratio
Regression 6 2.55 E9 4.3 E8 147.7
Residual 33 9.49 E7 2.8 E6
TOTAL 39 2.64 E9
Variable Coefficient (labor Std. Err F-ratio
______ hour/ occurrence) _ I
Customer 2964 769.7 14.8
introduction
Part Shortage 3.6 1.0 12.5
Production 276.7 28.3 95.9
Revision Request
Model 200ER -2247.8 878.4 6.5
Defects 1.3 0.46 7.47
log2(x) of Unit -47732.6 8117.8 34.6
number
Discussion
In this, the top-level airplane regression analysis, we see all the expected
relevant variables in the regression: customer introduction, part shortage,
production revision request, model 200ER, defect rework and log2 of unit
number. The customer introduction variable, which indicates a new airline
customer accepting the 767, usually requires quite a bit more direct
manufacturing input because of the learning involving in assembling the
first airplane for a specific customer airline to fit its custom specifications. In
addition, during the customer introduction process, the airline customer is
usually more exacting in inspections and thus requires more time during the
acceptance process.
86
The part shortage and production revision request variables have the
expected effect of adding to the manufacturing effort required to assemble and
test the airplanes. The baseline airplane model of the regression, because of
its popularity and frequency of occurrence in the fifty plane sample, is the 767
model 300 (767-300). The model 300, which is approximately thirty feet longer
than the model 200, requires more assembly and integration time than the
model 200. As expected, the model 200ER variable has a negative coefficient,
which indicates that the model 200ER airplanes require less time to
manufacture. The defect variable, which counts the number of occurrences of
correctable rejectable conditions on an airplane detected by the Quality
Assurance department, is usually considered to be relatively insignificant in
terms of its overall effect on total manufacturing hours. However, as we see
through the analysis, defect rework labor significantly affects the total labor
hours expended in the manufacturing of airplanes. Finally, as expected, we
see a strong learning effect present for the total manufacturing labor input as
a function of the number of airplanes produced.
Construction of Variance Pie Charts
With the variance table from the statistical analysis, we can construct a
variance pie chart to assess the relative impact of manufacturing variances on
direct labor hours. I will use a hypothetical example to illustrate construction
of the variance pie chart.
Assume that a manufacturing firm analyzed the impact of
manufacturing variances on direct manufacturing labor hours using the
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methodology detailed in this chapter. The variable table it got from an
analysis of the manufacturing process (for one hundred production units) is
Variable Coefficient (labor Std. Err
hour/ occurrence)
Variable A 12.5 3.4
Variable B 3.6 1.0
Variable C 27 9.1
log 2 of unit number -1452.6 350
To construct the variance pie chart, we need to have the frequency count of
the relevant variables. The frequency count reflects the total number of
occurrences for each manufacturing variance (during the production of the
one hundred production units). Assume that we have the cumulative totals
for each variable in the regression as follows:
Variable Coefficient (labor Frequency count Cumulative
hour/occurrence) (total number of hours of
I occurrences) variances
Variable A 12.5 1200 15000
Variable B 3.6 2000 7200
Variable C 27 300 8100
log 2 of unit -1452.6 n.a1 5  n.a
number
Assume that 200,000 labor hours were expended for the manufacture of the
one hundred production units we are analyzing. Thus, the relative
15 Since the variance pie chart is used to illustrate the impact of manufacturing variances on
total direct labor input, worker learning (as reflected by log 2 of unit number) is of little interest
and is not applicable.
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percentage of the individual contributions of relevant variables are as
follows:
Variable Coefficient (labor Cumulative % of total
hour/occurrence) hours of manufacturing
I variances labor input 16
Variable A 12.5 15000 7.5%
Variable B 3.6 7200 3.6%
Variable C 27 8100 4.05%
log 2 of unit -1452.6 n.a n.a
number
From the table above, a variance pie chart can be now be constructed:
Baseline Manufacturing (84.85%) Variable A (7.5%)
Variable B (3.6%)
Variable C (4.05%)
M Variable A
O Variable B
0 Variable C
O Baseline manufacturing
Figure 2: Variance Pie Chart
16As a percentage of 200,000 labor-hours expended for one hundred production units.
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Application of Variance Pie Charts
Using the methodology outlined above, variance pie charts were constructed
for the four major shops and the entire airplane final assembly process of the
Boeing 767 airplane. Because of the propriety nature of these data, the
variance pie charts are not shown here.
Using the variance pie chart, a manufacturing firm can identify the
high impact "vital few" variances that most affect the manufacturing process.
Note that the most important manufacturing variances are not necessarily
the variances with the highest sensitivity coefficients in the linear
regressions. In fact, the most important manufacturing variances are those
variances that made the largest contributions (in terms of cumulative
percentages) to the variance pie chart. In the example above, note that even
though variance C has a larger sensitivity coefficient than variance A (27
labor-hours/occurrence versus 12.5 labor-hours/occurrence), variance A has a
larger impact on the variance pie chart than variance C (7.5% versus 4.05%).
4.7 Far Term Flow Time Reduction Strategy
In the previous section, I presented results of regression analysis showing
that, consistent with Pareto principle, a few variances accounted for the
majority of the impact on the direct manufacturing labor input for the
assembly of airplanes. Simply presenting these results, however, has little
practical application since just knowing that certain variances affect the direct
manufacturing labor input does not point to particular strategies for reducing
the level of these variances.
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In the regression analysis, one variance in particular, Operations
defects, accounted for a significant portion of direct manufacturing labor
input. Individually, each defect accounted for relatively few direct labor
hours to correct; in aggregate, however, defects accounted for a large portion
of the total manufacturing labor input for the 767 airplane program (based on
relevant variance pie charts). In this section, I study the hypothesis that the
engineering organization has an effect on the level of these defects and thus,
plays an indirect role in determining the total direct labor input required to
assemble the airplanes. I show that in particular, greenlines and engineering
rejections (both variances directly attributable to Engineering) have
significant impact on the level of defects and thus affect the amount of total
manufacturing direct labor input required to manufacture airplanes.
Working Hypothesis
I suggest that because of the disruption effects of engineering changes and
rejections, these variances have an indirect effect on the amount of direct
labor input required to manufacture the airplanes. First, the engineering
changes and rejections affect the total direct labor hour through secondary
effects (as outline in section 4.5) where disruptions in the work flow increase
the direct labor input required to completed pre-assigned tasks.
In addition, I suggest that the engineering changes and rejections affect
direct labor input in another way. In particular, I suggest that the disruption
effect of these variances, in addition to impacting direct labor input through
primary and secondary effects, also adversely affect the direct labor input for
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an airplane by increasing the likelihood of worker error (i.e. defects).
Specifically, I suggest that with the presence of engineering changes and
rejections, which are conditions of variance that cause changes in the nature
of the pre-assigned tasks in the control code, shop workers need to either
consult with their supervisors or review new drawings to determine the
proper actions to take for these variances. These disruptions, which affect the
normal work flow of the assembly sequence, increase the probability that shop
workers will make errors during the assembly process either due to
misinterpretation of the revised drawings or due to misunderstanding of the
instructions given them. To test this hypothesis, I ran a regression analysis of
defects as a function of numerous engineering variables. That is,
Defect count (plane)= a + b * (Engineering rejections count) +
c * (Greenlines) + d * (another Engineering
variance) +... (Eq.5)
where a is the intercept, and b, c, and d are the coefficients for the different
Engineering variances. The result, presented in the table below, shows that
defects are closely correlated to engineering rejections and completed
greenlines. This relation between defects, engineering rejections and
completed greenlines suggests an important strategy for productivity and flow
time improvements in the manufacturing environment.
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Variance and ANOVA Tables
R: R-squared: IAdj. R-squared: JRMS Residual:
.868 .753 .74 509.6
Variable Coefficient (defect Std. Err F-ratio
per occurrence) 
_
Engineering 3.75 1.2 9.8
rejections
Completed 3.79 0.38 101.0
greenlines
Long Term Productivity and Flow Time Improvement Strategy
Given the result of this analysis, which suggests that Engineering plays an
indirect, but important, role in determining the amount of direct labor input
required to manufacture airplanes-through its impact on defects, suggests that
by focusing Engineering efforts on reducing engineering rejections and
greenlines, the level of defects can be decreased and labor productivity can be
improved. Thus, by conducting cause-effect analysis on defects and by
establishing significant correlation between defects and specific engineering
release quality measures, we have established an interlink between
Engineering and Operations.
With recognition of their respective impact on each other, Operations
should be willing to invest in Engineering, in the form of human and/or
capital investments, to secure Engineering commitment to improve specific
measures in engineering release quality (such as engineering rejections and
greenlines), which will in turn bring about reductions in defect levels that
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will result in significant improvements in labor productivity. The improved
labor productivity (lower labor input) brings about three significant benefits:
1) lower direct labor cost, 2) decreased variable labor overhead, and 3) reduced
flow time cost. The improved labor productivity can bring about reduced
flow time cost because presently, a significant portion of the current flow time
is allocated to variance-related activities. If the level of these variances can be
reduced, the efforts required to correct these variances will decrease and the
associated flow time presently allocated to these variance-related activities can
be taken out without incurring additional risk to the schedule. Thus, with
proper recognition of the relative roles and impact of Engineering and
Operations, a wise investment by operations can bring about significant
variance reductions resulting in lower levels of direct manufacturing labor
input required to perform pre-assigned tasks. The improved labor
productivity can then be realized through flow time reductions, thus
retaining the skills of the trained work force, decreasing the direct labor
content of the airplanes, and reducing flow time cost.
4.8 Conclusion
As indicated by the high adjusted R-squared of the regressions for the major
shops and the total airplane manufacturing process, the working hypothesis
relating actual manufacturing labor input to baseline work time and the
effects of external manufacturing variances is consistent with production
experience. Given the results of the analyses for the major shops and the
total airplane, along with the cause-effect analysis for defects, these analyses
offer several lessons and suggest specific strategy for improving productivity
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and flow time. First, the regression focuses improvement efforts on the high
impact variances instead of diverting attention onto all the variances.
Second, the important variances are not necessarily the variances with the
highest visibility. Instead, we should begin focusing our efforts on those
variances which individually may not require much direct labor to correct,
but, when aggregated, account for significant portions of the total direct labor
input (such as defects). Third, Engineering has an important indirect impact
on direct manufacturing hours through the effects that engineering release
quality has on high impact variances such as defects.
Taken together, these lessons suggest a concrete long term flow time
reduction strategy. Specifically, by investing in Engineering, with
commitments to improve engineering release quality by reducing associated
engineering changes and rejections, Operations can dramatically improve its
productivity (through reduced variance-related activities due to improved
engineering release quality) and profitability by realizing these productivity
improvements through flow time reductions which brings about lower direct
labor input, decreased variable overhead, and most importantly, flow time
cost savings.
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Chapter 5 ROLE OF INCENTIVE SYSTEMS IN
MOTIVATING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
5.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the role of incentive systems in motivating and
sustaining organizational change. We begin by first reviewing the current
incentive system and analyzing how the present system affects the behavior
of individual organizations. We see that with the present production
planning system, where productivity improvements are primarily realized
through labor reductions, there is a negative feedback to line workers to
improve process efficiency due to fears for their job security. I suggest that
incorporating flow time as a specific performance objective will better focus
management's attention on total product cost (which includes flow time
cost), compared to the present situation, where management attention is
focused primarily on the labor and capital equipment components of total
product cost.
Specifically, I propose that flow time cost responsibilities be moved
down from the corporate level to the operating division level to properly
recognize the central role that operating divisions play in determining
corporate flow time cost. Under the proposed system, where flow time cost
responsibility is pushed down to the operating division level, long term
corporate profitability objectives are better served since division management
will be in a far better position to make appropriate production and resource
allocation decisions based on the new, total product cost concept rather than
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under the present system, where division management are making
production and resource allocation decisions primarily focused upon
managing labor cost and capital expenditures. The proposed system
empowers the operating divisions, who are in a far better position to be able
to understand and assess the relative effectiveness and associated costs and
benefits of specific flow time reduction proposals than the corporate office, to
evaluate and implement those proposals that most benefit divisional and
corporate profitability goals.
5.2 Current Incentive System
Presently, operating division general managers judge the relative
performance of their divisions during the fiscal year by determining whether
the divisions have met their delivery schedules within allotted budgets. At
the operating division level, operating budget consists of, among other
things, capital expenditures and head count. As a result, divisional head
count and capital expenditures are closely monitored by management. In this
section, I examine the effects that the current incentive system have on head
count management policy and capital expenditure decisions.
Head Count Management
Under the present system, operations managers are given head count targets
for each quarter. These head count targets are negotiated ahead of time
between the Operations and Finance organizations during the annual
division budgeting process. These head count targets are based on production
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and labor variables such as production rate, worker skill index1 , and learning
curve. The learning curve assumes that the number of labor hours required
to manufacture a product decreases as a function of the quantity of the
product produced. According to learning curve theory, unit labor hours
decrease because workers learn about specific aspects of the manufacturing
process for the particular product as they become more experienced.
Relation Between Learning Curve and Worker Skill Index
Learning curve benefits are in addition to skill index benefits because skill
index focuses on the general experience level of the work force while learning
curve focuses on the specific learning that workers gain about a particular
manufacturing process. Although separate, skill index and learning curve are
not necessarily independent and might affect each other as follows. An
experienced work force (with correspondingly high skill index) should lower
the number one unit hours required to manufacture the first unit airplane.
In addition, the slope of the learning curve (rate of worker learning) might
also be a function of the worker skill index since the more experienced
workers should learn faster than a less experienced work force. Thus, skill
index and learning curve are two separate but not necessarily independent
parameters affecting the total labor hours required to manufacture airplanes
on the production line.
In the present methodology, as the number of airplanes produced
increases, the number of labor hours allotted to manufacture each airplane is
1This index is a measure of the aggregate work experience of the labor force.
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reduced based on historical learning curve rates calculated from past airplane
programs. Under these situations, managers are judged on whether they can
meet production goals within the allotted head count without utilizing
significant amounts of overtime to buffer against unforeseen variances.
How Incentive Systems Affect Flow Time Buffer and Head Count
In the current incentive system, management relies heavily upon head count
reductions as tangible proof of productivity improvements on the shop
floors. As a result, operations managers control head count targets closely
and rarely deviate from these targets. Hayes, Wheelwright and Clark2 (among
many others) noted, "you get more of what you inspect, not what you expect."
Thus, Operations managers, motivated by the incentive system to meet
production schedule within a given head count goal without utilizing too
much overtime, learn to use flow time and inventory buffers to insure that
they meet these objectives.
As noted in section 3.3, without visibility of flow time cost, Operations
managers may increase their production flow time to insure that they meet
production schedule within given head count target since longer flow time
gives them the flexibility to better manage varying work loads between
consecutive airplanes. For example, if a control code has four days of flow
time and operates in a four day production cycle, there is only one tool in the
control code and the control code works on one job at a time. In this case, if
the job content of each airplane varied greatly (because of manufacturing
2 Hayes, Wheelwright, Clark. Dynamic Manufacturing 1988.
99
system variances), the demand on the work force will vary significantly from
airplane to airplane.
Thus, in this instance, to insure that the control code always meet
production schedule, the control code must be staffed at a level such that it is
able to complete even the most labor intensive jobs within the allotted
manufacturing flow time. This method, while insuring that production
schedules are met, means that some workers will remain idle during jobs
where the labor input required is less than the capacity of the staffing level3 .
Because of the varying nature of the work load, head count targets based on
the expected average of job work loads could not be met by the control code
supervisor without incurring schedule risk. Under the present system, this
practice leads to unfavorable management reviews since the control code
supervisor will be hard pressed to meet schedule needs within target head
count.
How Increased Flow Times Reduce Effects of Job Work Variations
Now, if this same control code has six days of flow time (compared to four
flow days in the previous example) and still operates in the four day
production cycle, there will be two tools in the control code operating
simultaneously on two consecutive jobs. The control code supervisor has
some flexibility to better utilize his work force by shifting workers from one
job to another. The greater number of jobs in the control code has a
smoothing effect on the labor requirement at the control code because if a
3 1n this example, the control code is staffed to be able to complete even the most labor intensive jobs
within the allotted flow time.
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difficult, labor intensive job is followed by a relatively easy, low labor
requirement job, the supervisor can move people from the easy job to the
hard job and hence balance the work load between these work teams within
the six days allowed per job.
Thus, the longer manufacturing flow time, resulting in the larger
number of jobs in the control code, has a "rolling averaging" smoothing effect
on the work load in the control code. With longer flow times, control code
supervisors can staff at a level closer to the average of the work load than he
can under the shorter flow time. So, the increase in the flow time (which we
term a flow time buffer) gives control code supervisors the flexibility to move
workers around to maximize worker productivity and better adhere to head
count targets. Given the incentive system's emphasis on head count and
schedule, we should not be surprised to discover that operation supervisors
are motivated to maintain longer flow times or flow time buffers.
Cost of Flow Time Buffers
While the benefits of flow time buffers are attractive, the cost associated with
these flow time buffers are considerable. Increased inventory carrying cost,
revenue opportunity cost and variable capital cost are only the more tangible
costs of these buffers. These flow time buffers also have many intangible
costs4. The flow time buffers increase the length of time required to get
feedback on production problems from the line, thus increasing the amount
of rework performed since corrective actions are longer in coming. The flow
4 See chapter 4 for discussion of intangible costs of flow time.
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time buffers and associated inventory also cover up production problems and
impede Total Quality Management (TQM) teams' efforts. These are only
some of the many intangible costs of flow time buffers and must be taken into
consideration when weighing the relative costs and benefits of flow time
buffers.
Negative Feedback to Workers
As discussed in the earlier section, one of the shortcomings of the current
system, where the line managers in the factory manage the line to adhere to
head count targets, is that these managers are forced to increase flow time in
order to meet production schedule within head count targets, thus incurring
numerous tangible and intangible flow time costs.
Another shortcoming of the present system, which overemphasizes
head count as the primary cost control method, is the negative feedback to
line workers to improve product quality and labor productivity. Since head
count targets are based on learning curve slope (the rate of worker learning),
the faster the work force learns, the faster the work force head count
decreases. Under such conditions, the work force is really being asked by
management to sacrifice its own self interest by sharing insights learned about
the manufacturing process. By improving quality and productivity which
increases worker learning over and above the learning curve, the workers are
further jeopardizing their own job security. Thus, if the workers learn any
productivity improvement processes, they are likely to keep the knowledge to
themselves because of the negative feedback in the present head count driven
production planning system.
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Effect of Present System on Capital Expenditures
In the present system, capital equipment expenditures are primarily driven by
technological requirements of the production environment (automated
riveting systems for improved reliability and repeatability). Occasionally,
capital equipment expenditures are justified on the basis of production cost
savings. In these instances, the capital equipment are usually automation
equipment justified on the basis of cost savings related to reduced number of
line workers. Thus, capital expenditures relating to quality or reliability
improvement projects which have benefits that are hard to quantify are
difficult to justify under the present system.
Effect of New Incentive System on Capital Expenditures
Under the proposed system, where flow time cost is visible and its reduction a
specific management objective, capital expenditure requests dealing with
improved product quality and tool reliability that were not approved in the
past because of lack of financial justification now have a better chance of being
approved. This is because proposals dealing with improved product quality
and tool reliability helps to reduce manufacturing system variance. As
discussed in chapter 4, lower variances lead to improved labor productivity
which can in turn translate into flow time reductions which bring about
significant flow time cost savings. Thus, if a capital expenditure proposal
dealing with product quality or tool reliability can bring about improvements
in the "vital few" manufacturing variances or better yet, directly lead to flow
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time reductions, the proposal will now have established tangible benefits
(reduced flow time cost) for its implementation. Thus, the incorporation of
flow time cost into the management incentive system will increase the
likelihood for implementation of these important, but formerly overlooked,
projects.
5.3 Incentive System Recommendations
To address the issues raised in the previous sections, I suggest that the current
management incentive system be analyzed and restructured as necessary to
properly align worker interests and management objectives with corporate
goals. Specifically, I propose that, as a first step, flow time cost be charged to
the operating division's annual budget, thereby moving responsibility of
these costs from the corporate level to the operational level where the costs
are actually incurred. There are several advantages to this re-alignment.
First, by charging flow time cost to the Division operating budget, this
should encourage cross functional communications during the budgeting
process between the Engineering and the Operations organizations. By
having a common objective, that is, lowering total product cost (which
includes flow time cost), it will be in the common interest of both
organizations to increase inter-group communications. Through the
increased communications, these groups will better understand the
relationship between Operations and Engineering and recognize how one
organization's actions affect the other organization's well being.
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Presently, the Engineering and Operations organizations have separate
and distinct functional responsibilities, each organization pursuing similar
but sometimes diverging objectives. The Engineering organization, while
recognizing that design for manufacturing (DFM) is important, is still
primarily judged by management on whether or not it has met project design
schedules. The manufacturing organization, which has relatively little
influence on the Engineering organization, is judged by management on
adherence to schedule and labor cost rather than schedule and total
production cost. As a result, these organizations operate relatively
autonomously and there are little interactions between these groups and little
recognition (officially) of the relative impact these groups have on each other.
New Cooperative Efforts
With the proposed change of incorporating flow time cost into the
management budget, I hope to encourage Operations and Engineering
management to recognize their respective roles and impact on each others'
organization and initiate new joint efforts to bring about lower flow time
costs which benefits both organizations. It is important, under this system,
for Operations and Engineering to recognize that improved engineering
releases reduce important manufacturing variances such as defects5 ,
engineering changes, and part shortages, and, that lowering these variances
can in turn brings about significant reductions in direct labor input required
for the manufacturing of the airplanes. More importantly, it is critical that
5 See chapter 4 for discussion of relationship between defects and Engineering rejections.
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these two organizations realize that reductions in manufacturing variances
will not only decrease direct labor, but also decrease variable overhead and
manufacturing flow time costs.
Relation Between Direct Labor Input and Flow Time
The reduction in variances enables manufacturing to reduce flow time
because currently, a significant portion of direct labor input is attributable to
variance-related activities 6. The direct labor input is in turn related to flow
time since direct labor input per job at a control code is equal to flow time (in
work days) multiplied by the number of workers in the control code working
on the particular job7 (not necessarily equal to the total number of workers in
the control code since the control code may have more than one job or tool
position8 ). Thus, since a portion of the direct manufacturing labor input is
allocated for variance-related activities, by noting the relationship between
direct labor input and flow time, we see that a portion of the present
manufacturing flow time is similarly allocated to expected variance-related
activities. So, if the level of significant manufacturing variances are reduced,
the portion of present flow time that is currently allocated for variance-
related activities can then be reduced without increasing risk to the
production schedule.
6 See chapter 4 for discussion on relationship between variance and flow time.
7 Multiply by eight hours per work day.
8 Direct labor input per job can also be calculated using the following formula:
Direct labor input = (production cycle time) * (total number of workers in control code).
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Mutually Beneficial Actions
From the earlier section, we see that improved engineering releases impact
operations by reducing the level of the external variances affecting direct labor
hours. This in turn reduces direct labor cost, variable overhead and lowers
flow time cost by reducing the flow time buffers previously allocated to
variance-related activities. Under the proposed incentive realignment, I hope
that the new common objective of reducing flow time cost (the first step
toward the eventual goal of recognizing total product cost) will encourage and
enable the Operations organization to "invest" in Engineering, with either
human and/or capital investments, to improve the quality of engineering
releases which will in turn improve their own productivity and increase the
profitability of the entire division. To do this will require recognition of the
two organizations' relative impact on each other and require close
-coordination and team effort between the groups and encourage team efforts
between these two organizations.
Shop Floor Implementation
To motivate continuous flow time improvement at the shop floor level, I
propose that flow time be added to the manufacturing performance objective
for control code supervisors and that flow time savings be shared with
responsible work teams. Specifically, I suggest that flow time cost be charged
to the control code budgets. I suggest that when a control code supervisor
107
wants to add flow time, he9 will be charged the respective flow time cost to his
budget. Similarly, when a control code supervisor reduces flow time in the
control code, he will be credited with the flow time cost savings (the savings
should be credited to the budget annually since the flow time cost savings is
of a recurring nature relative to the old flow time cost structure).
Note that this proposal makes no assumptions about how much buffer
is in the present flow time and does not penalize supervisors if they are
unable to (or do not wish to) reduce flow time. However, if a control code
supervisor wants to add flow time to his control code, this proposal forces
him to carefully evaluate all other alternatives before adding the flow time.
This insures that flow time is not further buffered simply because it is the
easiest thing to do.
On the other hand, if a control code supervisor is innovative and
works closely with his work team and the Industrial and Manufacturing
Engineering groups to improve productivity and reduce flow time buffers,
they will be recognized and rewarded jointly for their efforts. This proposal
encourages the control code supervisors, their respective work teams, and the
Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering groups, people who have the best
knowledge about the specific tasks in the control codes and the actual time
required to execute them, to weigh the relative costs and benefits of flow time
reduction consistent with corporate profitability objectives. That is, unlike
the present system, where management focuses primarily on head count and
capital expenditures, the proposed system will encourage the work teams to
9For readability, I will use the male gender form to refer to control code supervisors instead of he/she
for the remainder of the chapter.
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look at reducing the overall product cost as opposed to simply minimizing
the labor and capital expenditure component of total product cost.
Work Team Implementation
Presently, there are few shop floor work teams at Boeing. Past efforts to
implement work teams in the work place have met with limited enthusiasm
or success. I suggest that these implementation efforts have been hampered
(at least partly) by the hierarchical structure of the organization and by the
lack of incentive system adjustments to motivate the manufacturing
organization toward work team structure10 .
The team structure, while encouraging team work and group problem
solving, also requires that team members freely share knowledge and
information with each other. The team concept thus has many implications
for the power structure of the work place. First, by having work teams that
can take the initiative to identify and solve production problems on their
own, supervisors and managers effectively lose some degree of control (and
power) over the activities of the work teams. Second, to effectively
implement the work team structure, team members must pool together their
collective experience and resources to solve the problem at hand. While
sound in theory, when put in practice, the team concept requires the effective
surrender of the key determinants of relative prestige and power among shop
workers: knowledge and information. Thus, the team structure requires
1 0Lack of union support may have also hampered past work team implementations.
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senior workers to, in effect, give up a portion of their source of power for the
common good of the team.
Unfortunately, this practice is not encouraged by the current incentive
system. In a work team environment, where the most senior and
knowledgeable workers have the most to lose with respect to their power and
influence, these workers are not currently motivated by the incentive system
to contribute to their work teams 11. It is therefore not surprising that the
most experienced workers in the production line are usually unenthusiastic
about work team implementations in their area. I suggest that this lack of
enthusiasm has less to do with the "old timer" attitude often cited as the
reason for these workers' attitude as much as these workers' recognition of
the relative power shift associated with the work team structure.
To encourage work team implementation, I suggest that team
performance be included as a key measure in an individual worker's
performance evaluation. Furthermore, I propose that workers be recognized
and rewarded on the basis of their willingness to help and assist others
members of the team and their relative contribution to the team's overall
success. This realignment (implemented through supervisors and peer
reviews) thus addresses some of the concerns noted above for the most
experienced shop workers. With the new structure, experienced workers will
not be rewarded by what they know, but rather, by how they contribute their
know-how toward the success of the team. By judging the workers'
performance by their relative contribution to the team's success, it will be to
the advantage of experienced workers to work and contribute within the team
1 1Under the current incentive system, a worker's pay is solely based on his/her job classification and
associated skills.
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to improve their relative importance and influence (both of which should be
rewarded with proper recognition and compensation).
With respect to the supervisors and managers who stand to lose some degree
of control over the activities of the work teams, I propose a similar reward
system which judges the performance of these managers by the relative
performance and learning (skills improvement of work team members) of
their work teams. This realignment should hopefully motivate supervisors
and managers to overcome their initial reluctance and begin emphasizing the
advantages of the work team structure (and the skills set improvement of
individual work team members). Without the cooperation of these
supervisors and managers, work team implementations have little chance of
success.
Thus, while incentive systems alone do not explain the lack of success
of work team implementations at Boeing, I suggest that realignment of the
incentive system is a minimum necessary condition that should significantly
impact the future success of work teams at Boeing12.
Precautions
Associated with these proposals, however, are possible complications that
should be taken into account prior to implementation. In particular, in the
proposals to motivate control code work teams to reduce manufacturing flow
12For more information and background on the benefits of work teams, please refer to a joint thesis study
conducted at the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) which showed that work team implementation
(using Just-In-Time inventory control policy, Statistical Process Control (SPC) and cross training)
strongly correlated to improvements in product quality, team productivity and process efficiency. See
Camhi and Tai theses, MIT, 1991.
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time, proper precautions must be taken to insure that these flow time
reduction efforts do not adversely affect product quality.
5.4 Organizational Implications of Recommendations
As previously noted, the proposed changes in the management incentive
structure can bring about desired inter-organizational communications
between Engineering and Operations. However, success of these changes are
not guaranteed. Clearly, simple incentive system changes alone will not
necessarily bring about desired organizational changes within the
organization. Under the current leadership, the company has stressed the
importance of total product quality and the importance of team work
(between workers and management and between Engineering and
Operations). I have suggested a possible scenario where, by aligning the
objectives of the Engineering and Operations organizations more closely (by
incorporating flow time cost into the management report card), these two
organizations can better understand and recognize their respective roles and
impact on each others' actions and promote new team efforts to brings about
productivity improvements resulting in total product cost reductions (which
benefit both organizations).
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I presented some recommendations on how Boeing can better
align its incentive system to motivate its work force towards continuous flow
time improvement. In addition, I suggested specific shop floor
-4
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implementation proposals to encourage flow time reduction initiatives at the
manufacturing shop floor. Contained within all these proposals is the aim to
start evaluating the performance of the operating divisions using the same
criteria which the company uses to judge its own performance. Thus, the
operating divisions must begin to recognize and take responsibility for total
product cost, not simply certain specific components of the total cost that can
result in sub-optimization of production decisions which adversely affect
corporate profitability.
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I review recommendations made in this thesis and describe
actions taken by Boeing to address these recommendations. I also discuss
how the methodologies presented in this thesis can be applied to other
manufacturing industries.
6.2 Summary of Recommendations
The following is a summary of the three recommendations I presented to
senior Boeing management.
L Recognize flow time cost1
Presently, Boeing's management accounting system does not incorporate flow
time cost2. I show that there are three major cost elements associated with
manufacturing flow time: 1) inventory carrying cost, 2) revenue opportunity
cost, and 3) variable tooling cost. I suggest that inclusion of flow time cost in
the management performance evaluation system (at all levels) will refocus
present production planning methodology on the reduction of total product
cost (including flow time cost) instead of its present emphasis on reduction of
labor cost.
1Please see chapter three for detailed discussions.
2See chapter three for detailed discussions of flow time cost.
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Implement flow time reduction strategy3
With motivation to reduce flow time, I propose a concurrent dual-prong flow
time reduction strategy. First, I propose that the manufacturing organization
review present flow times for the entire manufacturing process and
recommend alternate near term flow time reduction strategies (such as
increasing investments in human and/or capital equipment expenditures).
The relative merit of these suggestions can then be determined by examining
the marginal cost (cost of implementing flow time reduction proposal,
usually a one time only cost) and the marginal benefits (reduced flow time
cost, a recurring benefit) of each proposal.
Interestingly, implementation of near term flow time reduction
proposals has the paradoxical effect of increasing corporate profitability but
not improving manufacturing productivity 4 . In chapter 5, I show that a
significant portion of direct manufacturing labor is attributable to variance-
related activities. I also show that Engineering release quality affects the level
of certain vital manufacturing variances (such as defects), thus indirectly
impacting manufacturing productivity.
To improve manufacturing productivity and reduce manufacturing
flow time in the long run, I recommend a continuous quality improvement
effort which calls for Operations and Engineering to work together to raise
Engineering release quality. Increased Engineering release quality should in
turn reduce the level of manufacturing variances and improve
3 Please see chapter four for detailed discussions.
4 1n some cases, near term flow time reduction proposals may even decrease manufacturing
productivity. See chapter four for detailed discussions.
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II.
manufacturing productivity. Manufacturing productivity improvements
bring about three significant benefits: 1) reduced direct labor input per job, 2)
decreased variable overhead, 3) lower flow time cost.
III. Adjust incentive systems to motivate flow time reduction5
With the above methodology for quantifying flow time cost and given the
outline of the dual-prong flow time reduction strategy, there is nevertheless
little assurance that there will be sufficient impetus within the organization
to initiate and sustain continuous flow time reduction initiatives. I propose
that the current incentive system, which emphasizes reductions of particular
components of total product cost (such as labor cost), needs to be realigned to
properly motivate organizational change.
Specifically, I suggest that flow time be included as part of the
management performance objective. I propose that flow time cost
responsibility be moved from the corporate level to the operating division
level by charging flow time cost to the annual operating division budget. By
moving flow time cost responsibility to the division level and having a
common objective for the division Operations and Engineering organizations
(to reduce flow time cost), I hope that these organizations will begin to
recognize their respective impact on each others' productivity and initiate
new joint efforts to reduce flow time. Specifically, with recognition of
Engineering release quality's impact on variance levels and manufacturing
labor productivity, Operations management should be willing to invest in the
Engineering organization (through the budgeting process) in exchange for
5 Please see chapter five for detailed discussions.
116
commitments of improved Engineering release quality. This in turn lowers
the level of manufacturing variances, thus decreasing manufacturing
variance-related activities and increasing manufacturing labor productivity.
6.3 Boeing Initiatives
At the completion of my thesis research internship, I made presentations to
numerous Boeing management teams on the results of my research. In
addition, I covered specific recommendations which I worked on with many
Boeing engineers and managers. The response from Boeing management
was very positive. As the research and recommendations were conducted
with the cooperation of senior Boeing management and involved
participation of numerous Boeing organizations, there was considerable
support and ownership for the recommendations.
As a result of these meetings, a planning directive was issued to take
specific actions on these recommendations. First, a study will be performed
on the 747 program to determine the impact of manufacturing variance on
labor productivity. Next, the Finance department was assigned to quantify
flow time cost for each flow day in the manufacturing process. Finally, the
manufacturing organization at Everett was asked to initiate and implement
flow time reduction initiatives for the 747 and the 767 airplane programs.
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6.4 Application to Other Industries
The methodologies presented in this thesis on flow time cost and variance
impact analysis are equally applicable in many different manufacturing
environments. While the topic of inventory carrying cost is well known and
widely written about, the specific methodologies presented in this thesis for
understanding and quantifying the numerous components of flow time cost
can hopefully help some companies better understand and assess this
important manufacturing cost. In addition, the methodology presented in
this thesis for analysis of variance impact on manufacturing productivity
suggests new ways to examine the well known but difficult to assess impact of
external manufacturing variances.
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